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COMMERCIAL BANKS: PART II
Ralph J. Rohner*
The first portion of this article reviewed the array offederal and
state consumer protection laws affecting commercial banks and de-
scribed the many areas offriction created by such multiple lawmak-
ing. This half of the article addresses the question of how these
various laws are enforced by the federal and state bank supervisory
agencies and concludes with an evaluation of the many options for
improving the overall regulatory and enforcement structure for con-
sumer protection.
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I. THE EXERCISE OF CONSUMER ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES BY
THE BANK SUPERVISORY AGENCIES
A. In General-A Caveat
The enforcement of consumer protection laws is a responsibility of the
three federal banking agencies - the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the
Federal Reserve Board (Board) - either by express provision in the fed-
eral consumer protection laws or by implication from the Financial Insti-
tutions Supervisory Act (FISA).' In addition, the banking departments in
the several states have enforcement functions under state laws applicable
to banks within their supervisory authority. Yet, in describing and evalu-
ating the activities of these agencies, it is impossible to make precise empir-
ical comparisons.
On the federal level, the scope of enforcement responsibility varies
greatly among the agencies. OCC supervises approximately 4,600 national
banks, many of which are large institutions. The FDIC is responsible for
9,100 state nonmember commercial and mutual savings banks. In con-
trast, the Board has direct enforcement duties for approximately only 1,000
state member banks. Thus, the scale of enforcement activity differs among
the three federal agencies even though all are enforcing the same body of
laws and regulations. Moreover, the resources allocated to consumer pro-
tection by these agencies differ, even on a relative basis, since the agencies
have other administrative and regulatory functions competing for resource
priority.
Among the seven states studied,2 the differences in enforcement scope
are even more pronounced. There are wide variations in the number of
banks operating within each state. For example, Texas has 762 while Utah
has only 53. Moreover, since Kansas, Texas, Utah, and Virginia are non-
branching states, the agency's examination and enforcement burden is in-
creased because of its inability to sample branches of a single bank.
Another variable is the resources available to the banking agencies in each
of the seven states. Information supplied to the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors indicates that four of the seven states would need budget in-
creases of twenty to two hundred percent to maintain adequate supervision
I. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1976). For a discussion of agencies' powers under FISA, see
Rohner, Problems of Federalism in the Regulation of Consumer Financial Services Offered by
Commercial Banks. Part I, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1979).
2. As noted in Part I, this article is based on a study prepared by the author for the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The study concentrated on seven represen-
tative states: Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
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without federal assistance.' Additionally, in most of the states the bank
supervisor's responsibilities include not only commercial banks but other
financial institutions as well - thrifts, small loan companies, money order
companies, perpetual care cemeteries, and the like. These institutions cre-
ate competition for, and consequently drain, the limited resources of the
state agencies.
Perhaps the major differentiating factor among the seven state agencies
is the substantive law they are charged to enforce. Unlike the three federal
agencies, each of which enforces the same body of federal consumer law,
the scope and complexity of applicable state consumer laws differs mark-
edly from state to state.4 Those states which have enacted the UCCC, such
as Kansas and Utah, have a comprehensive range of applicable provisions.
Others, such as New York, have a wide range of consumer protection, in-
cluding incorporation-by-reference of a number of federal laws such as
Truth in Lending.5 Massachusetts has been specifically exempted from the
federal TIL law in favor of a substantially identical state version.6 In con-
trast, banks in Virginia and North Carolina are subject to state usury laws
and virtually nothing more.
Another reason why statistical comparisons among the state and federal
agencies cannot be made is the absence of comparable accounting and
budgeting systems. Among the three federal agencies, and even within the
aggregate budgets for each agency, it is difficult to derive reliable figures
for those expenditures attributable to consumer enforcement. Moreover,
each agency conducts its consumer enforcement efforts through a variety
of functional operations: a consumer affairs office in the central Washing-
ton headquarters; examiner training in a separate office; and examinations
through regional offices. Even though consumer compliance examinations
by the three federal agencies are now conducted separately from the com-
mercial examinations, none of the agencies keep records in a way that al-
lows meaningful expenditure comparisons to be made.
At the state level, the absence of reliable data on enforcement costs is
even more evident. The state supervisors, particularly those in states
where their responsibilities include nonbank institutions, can only estimate
3. See generally A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED BANKING (Conf. of State Bank
Supervisors 1977 ed.) [hereinafter cited as CSBS REPORT].
4. For a more complete discussion of state consumer laws, see Rohner, supra note 1, at
20-27. For a listing of state statutory provisions, see [1976-1978] 2-4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH); MONOGRAPH No. 8, A COMPILATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS REGULATING
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES (Cred. Res. Center, Purdue Univ. 1977).
5. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 353 (McKinney 1971).
6. See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,973 (1978). For a listing of all the states granted TIL exemp-
tions by the Board, see 12 C.F.R. § 226.55 (1979).
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the aggregate percentage of time allocated to commercial bank examina-
tions. Their responses to inquiries about the proportion of time or re-
sources expended on consumer law compliance were pure guesswork.
Thus, efforts to evaluate, comparatively or absolutely, the costs and bene-
fits of the consumer enforcement activities of federal and state agencies
suffer not only from a dearth of hard data but are at best apples-and-or-
anges comparisons.
B. The Federal Agencies
L Background
Active involvement of the OCC, FDIC, and the Board in consumer pro-
tection began in 1968 with the enactment of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act7 as each of the agencies was specifically charged to enforce the
disclosure provisions of Truth in Lending (TIL). Since then the number of
federal laws and regulations has multiplied,8 and with it the enforcement
responsibilities of the agencies. The energy, enthusiasm, and sophistica-
tion with which the agencies have tackled consumer compliance, however,
has grown slowly but steadily. This expansion is attributable to a number
of causes - congressional criticism, lawsuit settlements, and the inevitable
refinement of techniques over time.
a. Congressional Oversight
When TIL was enacted in 1968, Congress assumed that the federal regu-
latory agencies would adequately enforce it. But, according to the report
of the National Commission on Consumer Finance (Commission),9 all the
federal agencies did was to adopt, as part of the regular examination pro-
cedure, special procedures for TIL compliance. The Commission further
noted that, although the vigor of enforcement varied among the individual
agencies, all federal enforcement remained rather cursory through 1972.10
The need for a more energetic enforcement attitude on the part of the
federal agencies was underscored in 1974 when Title II of the Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act mandated the creation of separate
7. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18
U.S.C.).
8. For a compilation of these federal laws, see Rohner, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
9. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N
ON CONSUMER FINANCE 56 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
10. Id at 56-57. The Commission did commend the FTC for its efforts in enforcing
TIL, particularly since the FTC has no general and continuing supervisory and examination
authority over creditors that come within its TIL jurisdiction. Id at 57.
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offices for consumer affairs in each bank agency." While the Board's an-
nual reports preceding 1974 had regularly announced that TIL was being
enforced vigorously and evenhandedly and that "substantial compliance"
was being achieved, these conclusions had to be revised upon closer exam-
ination. Although the Board maintained, in its 1974 annual report, that
there was substantial compliance for written disclosures, it did admit to a
"disappointing" compliance rate for oral disclosure.
1 2
In 1976, a Senate Banking Committee Oversight Report' 3 found the en-
forcement efforts by all three agencies to be unsatisfactory. Several serious
problems were noted. First, although the consumer divisions had been
created as required, their staffs were too small to conduct adequate compli-
ance reviews and had no outreach capability. Second, the compliance ex-
aminations were conducted as an insignificant adjunct to the regular
commercial examinations by examiners with minimal consumer law train-
ing. Finally, the committee criticized the reluctance on the part of federal
supervisors to enforce state consumer protection laws. 4
In the same year, the Senate Banking Committee also issued a report on
enforcement of the fair lending provisions under the Fair Housing Act. It
found that only the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) had issued
regulations for fair housing enforcement through regular examinations;
the FDIC and the Board merely encouraged voluntary compliance. None
of the agencies required banks to keep racial records for monitoring pur-
poses, and no sanctions or affirmative action had ever been employed.' 5
The oversight hearings on TIL enforcement conducted by the House
Committee on Government Operations in the fall of 1976 produced many
11. See Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, 88 Stat. 2183 reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2545, 2545-57.
12. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, TRUTH IN LEND-
ING, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1974 10 (CCH Installment Cred. Guide
1975).
13. See S. REP. No. 1388, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
14. Id. at 6-11. The committee report also expressed concern over the small number of
formal enforcement actions, minimal consumer education efforts, and the Board's failure to
use its authority to proscribe unfair or deceptive banking practices. None of the agencies
had been able to give detailed breakdowns of violations actually detected. Consequently,
the report recommended that the agencies establish procedures to record and analyze both
examination and complaint violations. Id at 8.
15. See S. REP. No. 930, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976). In fact, the FDIC had denied
the Justice Department access to its records on fair lending. The committee recommended
that lenders be required to keep statistics on race and sex and approvals and denials of loans
and to furnish them to the federal agencies regularly and also to make them available to the
public. It also recommended that the agencies issue regulations delineating prohibited prac-
tices and sanctions in addition to increasing affirmative enforcement action. Id. at 3-4.
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of the same conclusions found by the Senate. 6 TIL enforcement activity
was found to be lacking in substance. The committee specifically recom-
mended revising examination procedures so that the types and numbers of
violations would be detailed and that the corrective action taken would be
specified.' 7 The committee further recommended that, rather than as-
signing regular examiners to consumer compliance on a short-term basis,
the agencies should develop career paths for consumer specialists. The ba-
sis for these recommendations was dramatically reinforced by the results
of separate compliance exams conducted in Massachusetts by specially
trained state examiners who found many more violations than had been
reported in FDIC examination reports of the same banks.' 8 This lack of
focus on individual violations was a major reason for the felt inadequacy
of the regular exams conducted by the FDIC.
These congressional critiques' 9 have had a pronounced impact on
agency policies. Although not all of the oversight recommendations have
been followed, the congressional attention forced the agencies to give con-
sumer compliance a higher priority.
b. National Urban League Lawsuit
Congressional pressure for strengthening consumer enforcement by the
three federal banking agencies was augmented by a lawsuit brought by the
National Urban League and other civil rights groups against these agen-
cies and the FHLBB in 1975,20 seeking to compel implementation of the
Fair Housing Act.2 ' The suit was brought because none of the federal
banking agencies had issued regulations, instituted racial data notation
systems, nor otherwise taken affirmative steps to assure bank compliance.
The Urban League lawsuit culminated in settlements between the plain-
tiffs and all of the defendant agencies except the Board. The settlement
agreements with OCC and FDIC clearly contemplate increased enforce-
16. See H.R. REP. No. 280, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
17. Id at 7, 12.
18. Id at 13-14, 17-18.
19. Although no committee report was ever issued, the Subcommittee on Consumer and
Monetary Affairs of the House Government Operations Committee held additional over-
sight hearings on the agencies' fair lending enforcement programs in the fall of 1978. See
Banking Regulatory Agencies' Enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act'and the Fair
Housing Act. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. On Gov't Operations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as House Oversight Hearings on ECOA and FHA
Enforcement]. Members of the subcommittee continued to be critical of the agencies' pro-
grams.
20. National Urban League v. OCC, No. 76-0718 (D.D.C. 1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976). For a discussion of the FHA's requirements and
enforcement responsibilities, see Rohner, supra note 1, at 7 n.9, 15 nn.54 & 56.
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ment activity in connection with those laws having a civil rights content -
Fair Housing, ECOA, and HMDA.22 Although the thrust of the agree-
ments was toward the development of data systems permitting an identifi-
cation of patterns of discrimination - either overt or covert through
application of the "effects test" analysis23 - emphasis was also placed on
providing examiners with analytical tools for the recognition of discrimi-
natory practices.
The settlements with the FDIC and OCC were signed in May and No-
vember of 1977 respectively, and many of the principal points of the agree-
ments have been implemented. Both agencies have appointed civil rights
specialists and are developing data analysis sytems, though more slowly
than contemplated. The FDIC has issued regulations to strengthen its
data-gathering for monitoring purposes," and OCC has proposed compa-
rable regulations.25
The Board did not join in settlement of the Urban League suit and even-
tually won a dismissal on grounds of plaintiffs' lack of standing.26 The
22. The FDIC agreed to establish a data collection and analysis system for determining
whether race or sex had been a factor influencing lending decisions, to train examiners spe-
cially to focus on racial and sexual factors, to create a position for a full-time civil rights
specialist, to amend current processing procedures for complaints of violations, to provide
the plaintiffs with an opportunity to comment on the FDIC's enforcement programs, to offer
suggestions for improvement and to give written explanations for all suggestions not fol-
lowed when requested by plaintiffs. See Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiffs, National
Urban League, et al. and Defendant, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Ur-
ban League v. OCC, No. 76-0718 (D.D.C. May 13, 1977). The settlement agreement with
the OCC was substantially the same. See Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs, Na-
tional Urban League, et al. and Defendants, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency, National Urban League v. OCC, No. 76-
0718 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 1977).
It should be noted that the type of enforcement activity called for in the settlements differs
from the traditional "forms review" which constituted TIL compliance activity. Here the
emphasis is on examiner training and investigatory techniques to produce a greater capacity
to identify violations while TIL enforcement involves primarily an accountant's type review
of credit instruments. This difference serves, in some measure, to separate bank compliance
activity into two parts: (1) more traditional hard-data reviews, as for TIL, Fair Credit Bill-
ing, and even for application-form aspects of ECOA and (2) a newer emphasis on piercing
the collected data for hints as to the existence of discriminatory lending policies. This divi-
sion is reflected in the reorganizations at OCC and FDIC to separate civil rights from other
consumer credit operations.
23. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n.7 (1979). Under this effects test, a lending practice is
prohibited if it has discriminatory consequences even if there had been no intent to discrimi-
nate. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. See 12 C.F.R. § 338 (1979).
25. See 44 Fed. Reg. 22,396 (1979).
26. National Urban League v. OCC, 78 F.R.D. 543 (D.D.C. 1978).
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Board, therefore, did not make a comparable commitment to improving
fair housing enforcement activities.
In general, the attitude of the Board seems more resistant to the adop-
tion of explicit mortgage underwriting criteria, as the FHLBB has done, or
to the full implementation of a data notation and analysis system, as the
FDIC has done. While the National Urban League suit was still pending,
however, the Board commissioned a consultant to study its fair housing
enforcement program. The resulting Dennis Report27 was critical of the
Board's lack of clear commitment to vigorous enforcement of the credit
discrimination laws and of the training, enforcement, and advisory pro-
grams in the civil rights area. All evidence indicates that the Board is
taking the report seriously and is making efforts to respond. Training and
examiner materials, for example, have been redesigned to incorporate
Dennis' suggestions. Thus, in the case of the Board, some impetus toward
strengthened enforcement has come indirectly from the Urban League
suit.
It is likely that the impetus of these lawsuit settlements, coupled with
continued congressional oversight, will produce greater emphasis on the
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in the area of mortgage lending.
Since the settlement agreements are limited to home mortgage credit, and
do not encompass the full scope of the ECOA, much less any of the more
conventional consumer protection laws, their broader impact is specula-
tive. They do indicate, however, that under pressure the agencies can
make more than a rhetorical commitment to strengthened enforcement.
2. Compliance Examinations
The primary enforcement instrument for all three of the federal bank
supervisory agencies is the compliance examination. In 1968, when the
agencies were charged with TIL enforcement, the logical technique was to
build a TIL compliance component into the regular bank examination
process, a process of periodic unannounced site visits intended to assure
the bank's safety and soundness. Thus, the use of regular commercial
bank examiners to review for consumer compliance is as much an histori-
cal accident as the result of conscious selection of the optimum enforce-
ment mode. It is only within the past three years that each of the agencies
has more or less separated the compliance examination procedure from its
commercial exam ancestry.
27. See W. DENNIS, THE DETECTION AND CORRECTION OF CREDIT DISCRIMINATION,
A REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (1978) [here-
inafter cited as DENNIS REPORT].
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a. Procedure
The basic methodology of consumer compliance exams is similar among
the three agencies.2 8 Each has assigned a number of its examiners to com-
pliance examination duty: on a six-month rotation at the FDIC and OCC;
on an indefinite basis at the Board. At the same time, each of the agencies
conducts special examiner training programs in consumer law compliance,
and the examiners assigned to compliance duty have usually attended one
of these special consumer law training programs.
As of about mid-1977, each of the three agencies separated its compli-
ance exams from the regular commercial exams. Certain examiners would
now look exclusively at the bank's consumer operations, and prepare a
separate compliance report. Only the FDIC directed that its compliance
exams should be done at different times than the commercial exams, thus
making the FDIC's compliance examination procedure altogether in-
dependent of the safety and soundness exams.
The actual examination process involves one or more compliance exam-
iners who sample the bank's files for various kinds of consumer credit
transactions, follow checklists and instructions for determining compliance
or noncompliance, complete worksheets noting violations, review bank
policies with appropriate bank officers, and complete compliance examina-
tion reports which are discussed with bank management. Compliance
exam reports are reviewed at the regional office level, and appropriate fol-
low-up steps are taken. These might include further consultations with
bank management, another special exam, or the forwarding of recommen-
dations for action to Washington headquarters.
b. The Examiner Corps
The number of examiners assigned to consumer compliance varies
among the three federal banking agencies as do the number and size of the
banks each agency supervises. The FDIC, with approximately 9,100 in-
sured nonmember banks, employs approximately 2,500 examiners nation-
wide, of whom approximately 200 are engaged in consumer enforcement
at any one time. OCC supervises some 4,600 national banks with a corps
of 2,200 examiners; about 135 of these are engaged in consumer compli-
ance. At the FDIC, therefore, approximately eight percent of its examiner
manpower is allocated to consumer enforcement; at the OCC, six percent
is allocated. At the Federal Reserve, by contrast, 100 of the system's 700
28. Much of the information in the following pages defies conventional citation. It is
the product of the author's reviewing numerous formal and informal agency documents and
of personal and telephone consultations with staff at each of the federal banking agencies.
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examiners are regularly involved with consumer compliance for their 1,000
state member banks. This is an allocation of more than fourteen percent
of the Board's manpower to consumer exams.
There are further differences among the agencies. The FDIC plans to
examine each bank once every fifteen months, the OCC once every two
years, and the Board, at least at the beginning of its experimental special
exam program, once a year. The length of time the examiners spend on
site also varies. The FDIC indicated its examiners typically spend two to
three days at a bank; the OCC said its average consumer exam lasts 8.7
working days; and the Board, with its higher ratio of examiners per bank,
indicated that its compliance exams range between five and ten days.
After the initial decision to pull a number of regular examiners "out of
the line" to do compliance exams, each agency experienced some uneasi-
ness and reluctance on the part of those examiners. Their concerns seemed
to be twofold: first, some of the examiners apparently viewed consumer
compliance as a less significant, less important aspect of the agency's re-
sponsibility, or at least something other than what they expected to do as
bank examiners; second, many of the selected examiners apparently wor-
ried that assignment to consumer compliance would take them outside the
mainstream of career advancement.
Fortunately, each of the three agencies indicated an awareness of the
need to assure themselves of dedicated consumer examiners who did not
consider themselves, and were not treated as, second-class personnel. Re-
cently, the three agencies have confirmed their plans to provide consumer
examiners guaranteed career advancement, and the FDIC even announced
that it was creating a cadre of special higher-level career consumer special-
i~S29ists. 9
Eventually, the separation of consumer compliance examinations from
commercial soundness and safety examinations may become so complete
and the techniques involved so different as to require a corps of special
consumer compliance examiners, with special credentials and training.
Such a clean separation of compliance functions from safety and sound-
ness is not compelled under the present circumstances, but in the future the
agencies should not feel bound by the conventional examiner model.
Basic to successful compliance examinations is the nature of the training
the examiners receive. No more than several years ago, according to con-
gressional reports,3" the agencies conducted only minimal training in con-
sumer compliance, each apparently using materials and instructional
29. See FDIC News Release (April 4, 1979).
30. See notes 13, 16 and accompanying text supra.
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techniques of its own design. The current emphasis on separate consumer
examinations performed by specially trained examiners has forced each
agency to expand its training efforts, and this in turn has drawn the agen-
cies somewhat closer together in their training approaches.
Each agency has been assigning examiners to compliance training pro-
grams in greater numbers than are being immediately assigned to compli-
ance duties. That is, they are developing consumer compliance expertise
throughout the entire examiner corps, although only a fraction of those
people will be doing compliance exams at any given time. OCC and the
Board offer two-week consumer law training programs while the FDIC's
program was only one week long until 1979. For "trainers," the Board has
tended to rely heavily on the lawyers from its Division of Consumer Af-
fairs, and their presentations have been criticized somewhat as being "over
the heads" of the examiners or too theoretical for the examiners' more
pragmatic needs. OCC, on the other hand, has preferred to use senior or
experienced examiners as trainers on the ground that they can communi-
cate better on the examiners' level.
In the area of antidiscrimination laws, the agencies' materials may all be
subject, in greater or lesser degree, to criticisms in the Dennis Report di-
rected at the Board materials. The Report noted that discriminatory prac-
tices could not be examined adequately by merely reviewing forms and
that it was necessary for examiners to know how to analyze credit records
for discriminatory factors not apparent on their face for unarticulated
bank policies and for possible effects test violations.3' In fact, all three of
the agencies have modified their materials beyond those of the Board
which Dennis reviewed. The revised materials now cover important civil
rights case law and point out the need to investigate the bank's overall
underwriting practices including its relationships with appraisers and real-
tors. Although these are needed improvements, they ought not to be lim-
ited, as they presently are, to mortgage credit since ECOA applies to the
whole universe of credit transactions.
c. Compliance Examinations: Scope and Depth
The scope of the compliance examinations - in terms of the body of
law for which compliance is reviewed - is essentially the same for all
three agencies. They examine for violations of each of the substantive fed-
eral laws and regulations discussed in Part 132 and also for violations of
incidental regulations such as those on savings account advertising,
31. DENNIS REPORT, supra note 27, at 59-67.
32. See Rohner, supra note 1, at 6-14.
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mandatory FDIC decals, and the like. Each of the agencies hedged on the
extent to which its examiners regularly reviewed compliance with state
usury and other state consumer protection laws. Since national banks are
subjected to state usury laws by the National Bank Act,3 3 OCC does pro-
vide its examiners with some training, instructions, and working papers to
test compliance with those laws. But even these materials do not delve into
the actual prevailing rates in the various states nor into the many compli-
cations in determining how rates are to be computed under differing statu-
tory formulae or court interpretations. Because of its exclusive visitorial
powers for national banks, OCC has acknowledged a responsibility to en-
force applicable state consumer laws and has begun to accumulate more
complete information on those laws.34 OCC has also begun, on a "piece-
meal" basis, the enforcement of state laws in several states in cooperation
with state officials.35 In contrast, the compliance manuals used by FDIC
and the Board do not address state laws other than usury.
Other aspects of the agencies' training and instructional materials un-
derscore the limitations in the scope of their compliance examinations.
For instance, banks may be exposed to liability for TIL violations in con-
sumer paper they obtain by purchase or discount from dealers.36 Yet, as of
late 1978, the examiners were not given special instructions for determin-
ing the dealer's compliance with sales and credit disclosure responsibilities.
Additionally, the examiner materials did not acknowledge the indirect ap-
plicability of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder Rule.
37
More serious, perhaps, is the failure of these instructional materials to
acknowledge the impact on bank compliance of the many judicial inter-
pretations of laws such as Truth in Lending.38 Both the instructional
33. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
34. See Form letter from John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency, to state bank
supervisors (August 2, 1977).
35. See Rohner, supra note 1, at 18.
36. See, e.g., Price v. Franklin Invest. Co., 574 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finance com-
pany); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 431
U.S. 929 (1977) (automobile manufacturer credit corporation); Cenance v. Bohn Ford, Inc.,
430 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. La. 1977) (automobile manufacturer credit corporation); Lauletta v.
Valley Buick, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (automobile manufacturer credit
corporation).
37. See 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1979).
38. In his report to the Board on credit discrimination enforcement, Warren Dennis
makes this point with respect to the body of civil rights case law which undoubtedly will
influence court interpretations of ECOA as well. See DENNIS REPORT, supra note 27, at 13,
19-22. Some significant case law is now included in the credit discrimination materials at
each agency. The same point can be made as to TIL case law although the problem of
synthesizing the hundreds of TIL interpretations into meaningful training instructions or
checklists is no doubt very difficult.
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materials and the case studies rely on references to or paraphrases of the
regulations or on official Board interpretations. Virtually no attention is
paid the numerous Board staff letters, nor is there any reflection of the
myriad qualifications and shadings added by court opinions. If a partial
purpose of compliance exams is to protect banks from exposure to suits,
the present procedures do not do the best possible job.
d Examination Effectiveness
There is a touch of irony in the way effectiveness of consumer compli-
ance exams is currently measured; that is, the more violations discovered
the better. Had there been uniform standards and procedures through the
years, one would expect the level of noncompliance to decrease as banks
became more familiar with the laws' requirements. But there is no doubt
that the current compliance exam procedures are more thorough and ex-
acting than in the past and are revealing higher percentages of violations.
In its early annual reports on TIL, the Board, after consultation with the
other enforcement agencies, reported inconsequential levels of violations.
The FDIC, for example, detected TIL violations in approximately ten per-
cent of its examinations in 1974, which was an increase of only three-and-
one-third percent from the preceeding year.39 The 1975 Board report, 40
however, noted that OCC, FDIC, and Connecticut state examiners had
found an increased number of violations attributable to better examination
procedures and increased examiner sophistication rather than to a trend
toward noncompliance. These reports were noted by the Senate Banking
Committee in 1976, in its July oversight hearings.4' Senator Proxmire ex-
pressed amazement that the banking agencies had taken almost no formal
actions against banks even though the FDIC reported discovery of viola-
tions in twenty-eight percent of its examinations and the Comptroller ac-
knowledged that "the number of violations noted in formal reports of
examination since 1969 is substantial and not capable of being itemized. 42
Against this background, the noncompliance percentages reported more
recently by the agencies may be less startling. The chart below contrasts
the numbers and percentages of examinations disclosing violations of Reg-
39. See Letter from Frank Wille, Chairman, FDIC to Jeffrey M. Bucher, Board of Gov-
ernors, Federal Reserve System (November 12, 1974).
40. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 62ND ANNUAL
REPORT 1975 345.
41. See Oversight Hearings on Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Banking Agen-
cies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Oversight Hearings on Consumer Protection
Activities].
42. Id at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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ulations B and Z for 1976, 1977, and 1978:43
Regulation B Regulation Z
# reports % violations # reports % violations
FDIC 1976 743 18.4 7970 25.6
1977 7410 26.6 7461 36.2
1978 6154 51.3 6172 81.6
Board 1976 - - - -
1977 549 78.0 548 83.0
1978 - 73.0 - 85.0
OCC 1976 - -
1977 2859 97.0 2759 88.0
1978 - 89.0 - 88.0
It should be noted that these percentages indicate the numbers of exami-
nations in which any violation is detected; they do not mean that the stated
percentages of bank transactions are not in compliance. On the other
hand, there is a remarkable disparity between the level of violations found
by OCC and Board examiners and by FDIC personnel. The generally
smaller size of the FDIC's state nonmember banks, with accompanying
lack of in-house lawyers or compliance officers, would seem to leave them
as prone to violations as their national or state-member counterparts. The
disparity therefore must rest, to some degree, in the relative meticulousness
of the examiners' reviews.
Both the agencies and the banks acknowledge that compliance exams
often serve an auxiliary educational purpose - informing bank officials of
interpretations and nuances of the laws and regulations. In this light, the
current examination results may be seen as serving both a corrective and
preventative purpose. The Board, in addition, has instituted a formal ad-
visory program in which consumer specialists from the various reserve
banks visit member banks for consultation on forms and procedures.
Some 770 such visits, averaging about a day in length, were made in
1977.44
In sum, the revised examination procedures implemented in each of the
three federal agencies in the past three years have been effective in identi-
fying larger numbers of apparent violations. If one assumes, as the agen-
cies do, that there is not a trend toward outlawry by the banking industry,
the high percentages of detected violations must be attributable to sharp-
43. These figures, although not amenable to conventional citation, can be verified in
reports from the FDIC and OCC to the Board on TIL and ECOA as well as in the annual
reports from the Board to Congress on TIL and ECOA.
44. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1977 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
FRB 1977 ANNUAL REPORT ON TIL].
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ened examiner skills and techniques. It is perhaps heartening that the
agencies themselves characterize many of these violations as "technical"
- unintentional failures to execute mechanical requirements in the law.
But it may also be the case that the examiners have concentrated on the
kinds of violations that can readily be discerned from a careful forms re-
view, leaving untouched more substantive patterns of violations, especially
in the civil rights (equal credit opportunity) area.
3. Complaint Handling Procedures
As required by the 1975 amendments to the Federal Trade Commission
Act, all three federal banking agencies handle individual consumer com-
plaints,45 both through their regional offices and at their Washington head-
quarters. When a consumer complaint is received, it is recorded on a
standard form, coded, and entered into the agency's computer. Records of
complaints received and handled at the regional level are forwarded peri-
odically to the Washington office. All complaints received in Washington
are acknowledged from that office.
Field examiners or regional office consumer specialists will then contact
the bank and request relevant factual information. Subsequent correspon-
dence with the consumer or the bank disposes of most cases. Direct con-
tact by the examiner with the bank or the consumer is in the examiner's
discretion and usually depends on the factual information needed for reso-
lution.
Each of the agencies professes to handle complaints of all kinds, ranging
from impolite tellers to substantial violations of law. Complaints involv-
ing unlawful practices are not confined to violations of federal laws and
regulations and include assertions of various state law violations. Thus,
agency enforcement through complaint handling has a broader scope than
enforcement via compliance exams which are limited to federal laws.
The Washington offices have only recently issued formal written proce-
dures for their personnel to follow for general consumer complaints.46 The
headquarters offices cannot be certain how closely these are followed; in
all three agencies, the regional offices have discretion to modify proce-
dures. Nor do any of the agencies have a standard means of deciding
when or what type of investigation should be made in a given case.
45. Pub. L. No. 93-687, tit. II, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)
(1976)). For a more detailed discussion of each individual agency's activities under this
provision, see the annual reports of the Board, FDIC, and OCC to the Congress for the
years 1977 and 1978.
46. See, e.g., FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMER COMPLAINT CONTROL PROCE-
DURE (1979).
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All three agencies keep computer records of complaint resolutions in
addition to data about complaints and inquiries received. Agency examin-
ers have access to the complaint correspondence with the bank in prepar-
ing for the compliance examination at that bank.
The agencies publicize the existence of the complaint procedures in vari-
ous ways, for example, by pamphlets with mail-in complaint forms at-
tached. Additionally, the agencies maintain a working referral system
among themselves although none of the federal agencies maintain a regu-
lar referral system with the state bank supervisors.
In short, while each of the agencies has taken its complaint-handling
responsibilities seriously, the overall effectiveness of the programs remains
questionable. The data on complaint volume indicates that many cus-
tomer "complaints" do not allege violations of law, but factual disputes,
discourtesies, or similar matters. The Board recently found, for example,
that no more than seventy customer complaints out of 3,200 involved ap-
parent violations of legal rules.47 In addition, the data systems at the three
agencies are not fully compatible. This has resulted in difficulties when the
agencies have attempted to combine their data for analytical purposes.
One of the hopes was that complaint data information would show pat-
terns of bank practices justifying enforcement action or the issuance of
deceptive-practices regulations. Thus far, the complaint procedures have
not permitted this broader use.
4. Education
Banker education is an important part of the regulatory function; the
more the banker knows of consumer laws, the fewer the violations and
risks of bank exposure to civil liability. Whenever a law or regulation is
enacted or amended, each agency sends its banks an up-date letter explain-
ing the law and how best to comply with it. Each agency will also
promptly answer inquiries from banks.48 Most of the educational services
for bankers are performed at the regional level. The agencies send speak-
ers to bankers' meetings and American Bankers Association seminars and
may organize their own bankers' workshops.
The agencies have also established various programs aimed at educating
the bank customer. These programs, while not unsuccessful, are not really
47. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON SECTION 18(F) OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT FOR THE YEAR
1978 4-6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FRB 1978 ANNUAL REPORT ON SECTION 18(F)].
48. The reference here is to rather informal responses by agency staff to industry inquir-
ies by letter or phone. This "educational" function is to be distinguished from the issuance
of official and unofficial opinion letters by the Board's staff.
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hitting the mark. For the most part, they are limited to speaking engage-
ments before consumer groups, the distribution of pamphlets, and the oc-
casional development of educational films. Although the content, range,
and volume of distribution appear impressive, there is some question as to
how many actually reach the intended audience. Distribution is often
through the banks, and banks are not generally anxious to inform their
customers they may have rights which can be asserted against the bank.
All three agencies are attempting to develop materials for schools and
other large groups49 in order to reach the public in a meaningful manner.
At the present, however, education seems to occupy a lower priority than
other enforcement efforts.
5. Remedial Measures
A review of the federal banking agencies' consumer protection activities
must take into account the corrective or remedial measures the agencies'
have brought to bear on banks.
a. Cease and Desist Orders
Since 1969, the agencies' annual reports indicate that cease and desist
orders are occasionally issued by the three bank agencies in response to
violations of the various consumer protection laws for which they have
enforcement responsibility.5 ° All are "consent" orders rather than the re-
sult of litigated complaints. One clear meaning of these figures is that the
three banking agencies have not used formal administrative proceedings as
an integral part of their enforcement arsenal. Instead, the agencies have
relied almost exclusively on examination reports and the resulting consul-
tation with bank officials to bring about informal and prospective correc-
49. For example, in 1978, the Office of Consumer Affairs and Civil Rights of the FDIC
drafted a proposal for a high school course in credit and general banking services. See
OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP.,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1978 3-4 (1979). See also COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT OF CONSUMER ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR 1978 3-5
(1979); FRB 1978 ANNUAL REPORT ON SECTION 18(F), supra note 47, at 5.
50. The FDIC appears to have used cease and desist orders most often. For example, it
has issued a total of 10 in the years 1976 and 1977, to enforce Regulation Z. See Letter from
Lewis G. Odom, Jr., Deputy to the Chairman, FDIC, to J. Charles Partee, Board of Gover-
nors, Federal Reserve System (November 27, 1978); Letter from George A. LeMaistre,
Chairman, Office of Bank Consumer Affairs, FDIC, to Philip C. Jackson, Board of Gover-
nors, Federal Reserve System (December 7, 1977), and a total of nine in the same two-year
period to enforce Regulation B. See Letter from Lewis G. Odom, Jr., Deputy to the Chair-
man, FDIC, to Nathanial E. Butler, Associate Director, Board of Governors, Federal Re-
serve System (December 19, 1978); Letter from George A. LeMaistre, Chairman, Office of
Bank Consumer Affairs, FDIC, to Janet Hart, Director, Division of Consumer Affairs,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (December 13, 1977).
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tions of detected violations. Both the agencies and the banks see a distinct
educational function in compliance exams; to the extent the examiners and
the agency supervisory personnel consider themselves as compliance in-
structors, it may be understandable that they have not taken hard-line en-
forcement postures.
The agencies' rare use of formal sanctions is probably attributable to
their reluctance to take a strong adversarial position against banks on con-
sumer protection matters. While formal administrative proceedings are
cumbersome, expensive, and understandably regarded as sanctions of last
resort, the inertia of conventional attitudes and the slow acceptance of
their roles as consumer protectors have been at least subconscious factors
in the determination of compliance policies. Yet, these policies are chang-
ing. The agencies' arsenal of formal enforcement weapons has also grown
by virtue of the amendments to the FISA contained in the recent Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act.5 '
b. Publicity. Consumer Notification
Not only have the agencies been reluctant to initiate formal administra-
tive proceedings, but they have been slow to seek any remedial action with
respect to past violations. None of the three agencies has been willing to
use publicity to bring banks into compliance. The agencies cite the confi-
dential nature of examination reports as barring any disclosure of the
names of noncomplying banks or of the nature of the violations. The
OCC, for example, has vigorously and successfully resisted a Freedom of
Information Act request from Consumer's Union for the identity of banks
found to have overcharged consumers under TIL.5 2
Neither have the agencies seriously considered informing the consumers
who are affected by violations, a technique proudly employed by several
state supervisors53 and recommended by congressional oversight reports.
54
While the traditional confidentiality of examiner reports may be under-
standable in the context of concern for safety and soundness, it is less clear
51. Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. I, 92 Stat. 3641, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3641, 3641-72. Title I of this Act amends the FISA in numerous respects, one of
which is to authorize the banking agencies to impose fines of $1,000 per day for violations of
cease and desist orders. Id at 3641.
52. See Consumers Union v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
53. See Federal Banking Agency Enforcement of Truth in Lending Act." Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 44 (1976)
(statements of Superintendent Quinn and Commissioner Greenwald) [hereinafter cited as
House Oversight Hearings on TIL Enforcement].
54. See H.R. REP. No. 280, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, 25-29 (1977); S. REP. No. 1388,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
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why compliance information should be so privileged. Where the applica-
ble law affords consumers a cause of action for actual or statutory dam-
ages, it may well be considered a part of the enforcing agency's
responsibility to see that those consumers are aware of their rights. Cer-
tainly the agencies have no hesitancy in telling the banks about violations
so they can protect their rights. Unless the agencies are intended to serve
exclusively as protectors of bank assets, it would seem there should be
some room for a controlled form of publicity about discovered violations.
At one point, a proposal to amend Truth in Lending to authorize the
agencies to publicize violators " was criticized as comparable to a bill col-
lector's "shame list" and dropped from the legislative proposal. Publicity
in the form of press releases naming offending banks may serve no con-
structive purpose beyond possibly embarrassing the banks into greater
compliance efforts. On the other hand, notification to individual affected
consumers, at least in any case where actual damages are possible, is con-
sistent with the notion that the agencies have a fundamental duty to those
consumers.56 Such a notification program need not present undue risk of
liability for the bank involved where the applicable consumer law permits
a bank to avoid any penalty liability if it takes corrective measures
promptly after discovering violations.57
The situation is somewhat different in the case of violations uncovered
in response to individual consumer complaints. Of necessity, to resolve the
matter in the consumer's favor where that is appropriate, the consumer
must be advised of the results of any investigation conducted. Apparently
this happens regularly, as each agency indicates that substantial numbers
- although a relatively small percentage - of complaints are resolved in
the consumer's favor. A distinguishing factor here, however, is that the
information indicating a violation does not derive from an examination
report and that veil of confidentiality is inapposite.
55. See S. 1312, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(0, (g) (1977), reprinted in Simplfy and Reform
Truth in Lending Act- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S 1312, S 1501, and S 1653, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 220-22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TIL Simploication Hearings].
56. The Regulation Z (TIL) Enforcement Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979), in fact
do call for customer notification, and the written notice must indicate that the bank's reim-
bursement is a result of the creditor's failure to make required TIL disclosures. Id at 1224,
§ 9. See also Questions and Answers Regarding Joint Notice of Statement of Interagency
Enforcement Policy for Truth in Lending 8 (prepared by the staffs of OCC, FDIC, FHLBB,
the Board, and NCUA 1979).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (1976). The creditor can avoid liability if it notifies the
affected consumer of the error and makes any necessary adjustments within 15 days after
discovering the violation and prior to any action being instituted or any receipt of written
notice. Id
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c. Restitution: The TIL Guidelines
The remedial measure that is currently attracting considerable attention
is restitution, that is, the ordering of refunds of specific dollar amounts to
consumers where TIL disclosures have misstated certain charges. The five
financial supervisory agencies collaborated on drafting such enforcement
guidelines and promulgated them in early 1979.58 As discussed below, the
reaction has been volcanic.
The present interest in a restitutionary remedy apparently originated in
the 1976 and 1977 congressional oversight hearings, in which both House
and Senate committees urged the agencies to pursue refunds for
overcharged customers.59 These recommendations cited a pilot study by
OCC which found overcharges of $1.6 million among twenty-seven na-
tional banks in the New England region. This estimate seems small in
light of further investigations by OCC and analyses of some 1,400 compli-
ance examination reports from 1977. Based on possible overcharges dis-
covered by the examiners, OCC estimated conservatively that overcharges
in excess of $32 million could have been made by national banks alone.6°
Adjusting that figure, even roughly, to account for state-chartered banks
could mean that the amount of customer overcharges among all banks ap-
proaches $60 million.6'
A legislative proposal to require restitution of overcharges resulting
from understatements by a creditor of an annual percentage rate or finance
charge was contained in the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act which passed the Senate in 1978 and 1979.62 In the meantime, with no
action imminent in the House, a joint agency task force drafted the uni-
form TIL Enforcement Guidelines whose sum and substance are ground
rules for restitution.63
58. The guidelines were first published in proposed form in 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg.
55,786 (1977). The final version appears in 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 280, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1977); S. REP. No. 1388, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976).
60. See Letter of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency, to Philip Jackson,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (November 21, 1977).
61. This figure is premised on the assumption that national banks hold approximately
50% of all bank-held consumer credit receivables. For the figures upon which this percent-
age estimate is calculated, see ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 1976 REPORT OF INCOME COMMER-
CIAL & MUTUAL SAVINGS BANK (FDIC 1976).
62. See S. 108, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1979); S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12
(1978).
63. According to the statements accompanying publication of the proposed and final
guidelines, their express purpose is to set forth the corrective measures to be taken when a
violation of TIL results in overcharges to customers. See 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979); 42 Fed.
Reg. 55,786 (1977). As the final guidelines indicate, reimbursement is the corrective meas-
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Once the guidelines were officially promulgated in 1979, both the OCC
and the Board wrote to a number of banks - the total is unknown but
reportedly is several thousand - requesting them to make "voluntary"
reimbursements of overcharges detected during recent examinations. Im-
mediately, there were signs of trouble. Rumors were rampant in Washing-
ton that certain banks would fail if they had to reimburse the specified
sums. Reportedly, unexpected technical questions about what Regulation
Z required also arose, and, in one case, the Examination Council, which is
coordinating application of the guidelines, responded to a state bankers
association's plea by "reconsidering" whether insurance cost disclosures
could be stated as dollars-per-hundred rather than as a lump-sum total.6 4
In August, 1979, the American Bankers Association filed suit against the
bank agencies, asking for a declaration that the guidelines exceed the
agencies' authority.65 Thus, the single instance in which the agencies have
taken an aggressive or adventurous approach to their enforcement roles
remains under a cloud.
The question of whether the bank agencies should embark on a broad
restitution program does not arise in a vacuum if one takes into account
enforcement activities outside the banking area. The FTC, for example,
has recently been granted statutory authority to seek restitutionary relief in
court.66 Consumer credit administrators in UCCC states and elsewhere
often have similar statutory powers,6 7 as do many state attorneys general.68
Thus, the notion of public officials seeking private remedies for aggrieved
consumers is not unique even for supervisors such as UCCC administra-
tors, who also have examination powers, although it is noteworthy that
most existing statutory restitution provisions require court action rather
than a mere administrative proceeding.
More difficult, perhaps, is the proper measurement of any refunds due.
If a creditor, for example, imposes finance charges that are permissible
ure to be taken for any overcharge greater than one dollar. See Statement of Enforcement
Policy, 44 Fed. Reg. 1222-23 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TIL Enforcement Guidelines].
64. The trade press reported these events. See, e.g., Washington Credit Letter, Aug. 27,
1979, at 3; id, Aug. 13, 1979, at 2.
65. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, American Bankers
Assoc. v. Board of Governors, No. 79-2066 (D.D.C. 1979). In response to this suit, the Fed-
eral Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has recommended significant revi-
sions of the TIL Enforcement Guidelines which would liberalize the reimbursement
requirements. See Legal Times of Wash., October 8, 1979, at p. 1, col. 4, and p. 6, col. 4.
66. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty, Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, § 206(a), 88 Stat. 2201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (1976)).
67. See UNIFORM CONS. CRED. CODE § 6.113 (1974) printed in [1976] 1 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 6303.
68. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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under state law but miscomputes and understates the annual percentage
rate (APR), is the consumer equitably entitled to a refund of the difference
between the disclosed rate and the permitted actual rate?69 If a creditor
fails to state any APR, has the consumer been damaged in the full amount
of the finance charge imposed?7" Additionally, should the agency's restitu-
tion order reach back to the initiation of these transactions? Perhaps the
sharpest debates about the pending guidelines and about the restitution
provision in the TIL Simplification bill had to do with the retroactivity of
such orders; that is, should the cutoff time be one year (the statute of limi-
tations for individual civil actions), October, 1974 (when TIL was
amended to permit recovery of actual damages), or July, 1969 (when TIL
first took effect)? The final guidelines apply to transactions consummated
since 1974."'
Nothing in the provisions cited as authority for agency restitution orders
expressly authorizes that remedy. The proposed guidelines rely on the
general administrative enforcement provisions of TIL, which are silent as
to remedies, and on the FISA cease and desist power, which does say that
orders entered after administrative hearings may require the bank "to take
affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from" violations of
the law. 72 The apparent rationale for the guidelines is that the "conditions
resulting" from TIL misdisclosure include the unfair retention of charges
beyond those actually disclosed. It is this rationale which will be tested in
the bankers' lawsuit.73
d ECOA Enforcement Guidelines
In addition to the proposed guidelines for TIL enforcement, the federal
supervisory agencies, including the FHLBB and NCUA, have jointly pro-
69. The guidelines clearly say the creditor must make reimbursement under these cir-
cumstances without regard to the legality of the charges under state usury laws. See TIL
Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 63, at 1223, § 4. In a sense, therefore, there is a conclu-
sive presumption of damage to the customer.
70. In this case, the guidelines provide that the omitted APR shall be the actual APR
reduced by 1/4% for mortgates, or 1% for other credit. See TIL Enforcement Guidelines,
supra note 63, at 1223, § 4(b).
71. Id at § 3(a).
72. The preamble to the guidelines states:
These Guidelines are adopted pursuant to the enforcement authority contained in
15 U.S.C. [§] 1607 and 12 U.S.C. [§] 1818(b) [1976] in the cases of the Federal
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller
of the Currency . ...
44 Fed. Reg. 1222, 1223 (1979).
73. According to the American Bankers Association, to require creditors to reimburse
funds resulting from a bona fide error would be unfair and would create severe hardship.
See Complaint, supra note 65, at 6-Il.
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posed uniform guidelines for the enforcement of Regulation B (ECOA)7 4
and the Fair Housing Act. The thrust of these proposals, however, differs
markedly from those for TIL enforcement.
The TIL guidelines define when restitution of overcharges will be or-
dered. Such a remedy, however, is largely inappropriate in cases of credit
discrimination where the violation does not usually result in measurable
overcharges. The proposed Regulation B guidelines, therefore, delineate
other corrective measures which may be used. For unlawfully discourag-
ing applications from protected classes of individuals, the guidelines call
for "affirmative advertising" to be directed at the discouraged class, along
with notifications to agents, dealers, community groups, and others that
the institution pursues nondiscriminatory elements in evaluating applica-
tions.75 Additionally, the guidelines would require the creditor to reevalu-
ate all previous applications in accordance with nondiscriminatory
standards, to solicit new applications from individuals discriminatorily re-
jected, and to refund fees and prepayment penalties that may be involved
in making the new loan.76
While these Regulation B guidelines constitute novel enforcement
mechanisms for the banking agencies, aimed as they are at undoing the
effects of past discrimination, consumer and civil rights groups find distinct
weaknesses in them. The "affirmative advertising" to be required as a re-
sponse to past prescreening practices, in their view, gives no assurance of
an effective change in the lender's applicant base. Nor does mere notifica-
tion to real estate brokers, dealers, and the like assure elimination of dis-
criminatory channeling of applicants. Similarly, while the victims of past
discrimination will be given a second chance to receive credit from the
offending bank, there may be no significant deterrent in that remedy.
The fact that these guidelines and those for Regulation Z (TIL) are prof-
fered as "uniform" guidelines also has pluses and minuses from the point
of view of overall enforcement policy. If all three agencies - five, includ-
ing FHLBB and NCUA - apply substantially equivalent criteria and
remedies, disparities of treatment among financial institutions would tend
to be eliminated. The new Examination Council is in a position to coordi-
nate the agencies' efforts if it has the will.77 On the other hand, should
74. See 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 (1978).
75. Id § I.
76. Id § II. Note that this could require lenders to reoffer loans at rates prevailing
when the discriminatory act occurred. For example, in a market where mortgage rates are
escalating monthly, this could result in a substantial monetary penalty for the bank. Thus,
these proposed guidelines do have an element of restitution and deterrence.
77. The FFIEC was created by the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
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these proposed guidelines be uniform in name only - as could be the case
if each agency, despite the Examination Council, goes its own way in inter-
preting them, training its examiners on their content and importance, and
scheduling the pace of their application - all of the existing enforcement
inequities will remain.
e. Criminal Referrals
Since criminal penalties attach to serious violations of certain federal
consumer laws, the agencies through their examination and complaint
handling function are in a position to discover and report to the Justice
Department possible criminal noncompliance.
Of the three federal banking agencies, only the FDIC appears to have
referred cases of TIL violations to the appropriate United States Attor-
ney," and none of these cases have in fact been successfully prosecuted.
This may be understandable. If the agencies are correct that most detected
violations are of a "technical" nature, and the result of inadequate under-
standing of the law, it would be very difficult for the Department of Justice
to prove that noncompliance was "willfully and knowingly" done, as re-
quired for criminal sanctions.79
f Unfair or Deceptive Practice Rules
A potentially far-reaching enforcement device, not designed to correct
individual violations so much as to serve prophylactic purposes, is the issu-
ance of regulations identifying particular acts or practices by banks which
are deemed unfair or deceptive. The power to issue such regulations,
which are similar to FTC trade regulations rules, was given to the Board in
1975 FTC Act amendments.8" But, except for the publication of two pro-
posed regulations to parallel pending FTC proposals,8 this enforcement
power has been unused in the five years since enacted.
82
Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. X, 92 Stat. 3694 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§
3301-3308 (Supp. 1979)). Its primary mandate is to coordinate the examination functions of
the three banking agencies plus the FHLBB and the NCUA by prescribing uniform princi-
ples and standards for the federal examination of financial institutions. Id § 3301.
78. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1978 11 (1979).
79. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-647, tit. It, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)
(1976)).
81. For a discussion of these proposals, as well as discussion of the Board's regulation
writing authority under §57a(f), see Rohner, supra note 1, at 10-11.
82. The Board indicated that it has initiated investigations into several possible
rulemaking areas. These include disclosures for deposit account customers, describing ac-
counts as free when they are not, closing customer accounts without notice, unnecessarily
[Vol. 29:313
Regulation of Consumer Financial Services
The value of such rulemaking is that, once offensive patterns of conduct
are identified, carefully drawn proscriptions against those practices pro-
vide fair warning to banks to adjust their operations, afford a surer basis
for examiner review and complaint handling, and, perhaps above all, pro-
vide some certainty as to compliance expectations. In addition, the mere
issuance of regulations probably produces substantial and widespread
compliance automatically from law-abiding bankers.
6. The Costs and Benefits of Federal Agency Enforcement
There is a dearth of reliable data from which to calculate or project
either the real costs of the enforcement programs at the three federal bank-
ing agencies or their real benefits to consumers. The inability of the agen-
cies to determine expenditures allocated to their respective consumer
compliance functions is in some respects understandable and perhaps even
unavoidable. Each of the three agencies has its enforcement operations
divided between Washington headquarters and regional offices. Within
each agency, consumer compliance activities draw on other agency opera-
tions - administrative, overhead, legal, and the like - in amounts diffi-
cult to verify. Computations of personnel time spent on consumer
compliance are imprecise.
As for consumer benefits attributable to agency enforcement programs,
measurement in dollar terms is quite difficult when corrective actions are
exclusively prospective and preventive in nature, which is the case with
virtually all compliance examinations up to now. How does one assign a
monetary value, for example, to the sense of well-being consumers may
feel when their complaints are handled satisfactorily; or to consumers' un-
derstanding of correct TIL disclosures brought into compliance after an
examination report; or to the sense of self-esteem consumers may experi-
ence when discriminatory questions are detected and eliminated from
credit applications? It is equally difficult to measure the market value to
consumers of the information contained in accurate TIL disclosures,
proper Fair Credit Billing notices, Fair Credit Reporting Act notifications,
or Regulation B statements of reasons for adverse action.83 One may as-
long "holds" on deposited checks, savings account advertising, and implying that credit life
or disability insurance is necessary. To date, none of these have produced concrete propos-
als from the Board. See FRB 1978 ANNUAL REPORT ON SECTION 18(F), supra note 47, at I-
4.
83. To pose these questions is not to suggest that there have been no efforts to evaluate
the costs and benefits of consumer protection laws. In fact, there have been numerous ex-
ploratory studies, some aimed at the federal consumer credit laws, see, e.g., T. DURKIN & G.
ELLIEHAUSEN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY (FRB 1978); Exercise of Consumer Rights
Under the Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair Credit Billing Acts, 64 FED. RES. BULL. 363
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
sume that some consumers utilize this information to gain some financial
advantage - a better APR, a higher savings account yield, or perhaps the
use of a credit card when the bank had previously declined to issue one.
This inability to quantify is true of any benefits attributed to prospective
changes in bank practices made as the result of a compliance examination.
Only when banks are directed to remedy the effects of past violations
does it become more feasible to measure benefits in dollar terms. Thus,
the clearest instance of measurable consumer benefit may be the reim-
bursements ordered by OCC to consumers whose TIL disclosures under-
stated applicable charges. Given the number of customer overcharges that
occur,84 substantial potential benefits would inure to consumers if refunds
of this nature become commonplace.
None of the agencies have published actual or potential dollar totals for
reimbursements under the TIL guidelines. If the proposed Regulation B
guidelines were in effect, it would be possible to measure, to some degree,
the explicit dollar benefits to individuals who received credit at a lower
APR after reconsideration or who were refunded fees and prepayment
penalties under the same circumstances. But such data is far from being
available.
While amounts of possible reimbursements to customers may be viewed
as benefits to the individuals who receive them, they are certainly not so
viewed by the banks who pay them. Thus, it is appropriate to ask whether
enforcement activities do, or can, produce benefits for the banks them-
selves. Some benefits certainly may flow to banks in the form of avoided
liabilities for civil penalties plus court costs and attorney's fees, liabilities
which could accrue if the banks persisted in unlawful practices. This is not
to say that careful and thorough compliance examinations will eliminate
consumer litigation, but only that banks will be less exposed to suits for
obvious violations if a compliance exam uncovers them in advance.
On the other side of the ledger, until very recently there was simply no
reliable data on the cost of agency enforcement. 85 The FDIC's expendi-
(1978), some aimed more broadly at consumer credit regulation, see A. HEGGESTAD, THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PUBLIC REGULATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES (Abt
Assoc. Inc. Final Report 1979), and some addressing even wider areas of economic activity,
see, e.g., M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF ECO-
NOMIC ACTIVITY (Am. Enterprise Inst. 1978). All of these studies are inconclusive as to
consumer benefits, and none focus on administrative expenditures of bank agencies.
84. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
85. The three banking agencies made an effort in late 1976 to formulate cost break-
downs for TIL enforcement for the House Government Operations Committee. The figures
compiled indicate that OCC's TIL supervisory costs were $200,000 annually from 1969
through 1975, that the Board had high start-up costs of $377,000 in 1969, which dipped and
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ture of $2,000,000, however, does include examination costs. Finally, it
defies belief that the FDIC's consumer compliance expenditures are ten
times those of both the OCC and the Board. It is unfortunate that this
reading of the data was broadcast in the public press.
In 1978, each of the three agencies submitted projections of equal credit
enforcement costs for fiscal 1978 and 1979 to the House Government Op-
erations Committee.86 The calculations submitted permit reasonable cal-
culation of the costs of their overall consumer compliance operations
beyond just the Fair Housing and ECOA components.
The chart below summarizes the aggregate expenditures for consumer




Compliance $4,152,50088 $2,443,079 $4,484,854
Program
Number of
Compliance 6,275 688 2,154
Exams
Cost per Exam $ 661 $ 3,550 $ 2,082
If one views examination reports as the primary end product of these
expenditures, the comparative figures among the agencies is significant. A
compliance examination by the Board costs nearly twice as much as one
conducted by the OCC, and almost six times one of the FDIC's. Com-
bined with the fact that the OCC conducts compliance exams only every
other year, while the Board examines annually, it is apparent that the
Board compliance examination efforts are twice as concentrated as the
OCC's both in time and in expense. At the same time, the small per-exam-
ination expense at the FDIC in 1977-78 bears about the same relationship
then rose again to $229,000 in 1975, and that the FDIC had estimated annual TIL enforce-
ment costs of $2,000,000, 10 times that of either of the other two agencies. See H.R. REP.
No. 280, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977) (table 4.6).
These figures pertained only to TIL enforcement, not to the broader array of laws for
which the agencies are now responsible. Furthermore, the data is not only outdated for
purposes of making any kind of current projections, but also inherently suspect. For exam-
ple, the figures for the Board do not account for the costs of TIL compliance examinations,
which totaled $344,846 in 1974 and $563,642 in 1975. Id at 59, Table II.
86. See House Oversight Hearings on ECOA and FHA Enforcement, note 19 supra.
87. Id at 601-07 (OCC); 1016-17, 1032 (FDIC); 1413 (Board).
88. This figure assumes that fair lending activities constituted 40% of the FDIC con-
sumer protection expenditures. The FDIC did not state this percentage, but both the OCC
and the Board did. The assumption, therefore, is that the FDIC's relative share is the same.
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to the OCC's as the average size of the consumer holdings of state non-
member banks compared to national banks.
For fiscal 1979, the OCC estimated expenditures at the same levels as for
1978. The Board said it was impossible to project 1979 figures. The
FDIC, however, indicated that it planned to increase its expenditures for
credit discrimination enforcement by 135%, based on estimated examiner
hours almost three times greater in 1979 than in 1978.89 It is unclear
whether this projected FDIC increase in one part of its compliance budget
would be new money or would be a re-allocation from other compliance
functions.
The range of 1979 projections from three agencies - utter unpredict-
ability from the Board, no change from the OCC, and a 135% increase
from the FDIC - at least underscores the difficulty of pinning down relia-
ble cost figures. It also suggests the need for more function-related budget
systems and greater planning and coordination among the agencies. The
new Examination Council may be in a position to develop these aspects.
There is a further dimension to the calculation of enforcement costs -
those related to the burden and expense for banks in responding to agency
enforcement actions. Some direct costs to the bank are involved in receiv-
ing and accommodating the compliance examiners and in affording them
space, materials, and personnel time during the actual examination. Infor-
mal contacts with bankers and their trade associations indicated that,
while these costs are real, no one could put a dollar figure on internal costs
incident to compliance exams. In addition, where violations are found in
the course of the examination or asserted in consumer complaints, the
bank must investigate and perhaps adjust the complaining consumer's ac-
count, or, in the case of systemic violations, reprint forms, manuals, and
similar materials, or retrain personnel. No data is available to document
these costs; yet bankers insisted they are real. They are another ingredient
of the overall cost of compliance.
To summarize, the information available indicates that the three federal
banking agencies - including regional offices and Reserve banks - are
spending upwards of $11 million annually to effectuate compliance pro-
grams. This figure accounts for the direct costs of the actual examinations,
the identifiable costs of Washington operations directly related to compli-
ance, and an indeterminate sum for the range of incidental and support
services needed for the program. These costs promise to rise dramatically
89. House Oversight Hearings on ECOA and FHA Enforcement, supra note 19, at 603,
1033, 1414.
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with the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act 9° and the
passage of the Electronic Funds Transfer bill in late 1978.91
It is worth noting, finally, the "pass-through" phenomenon that accom-
panies these agency expenditures. Since the agencies operate with funds
provided through bank assessments, those annual costs are ultimately re-
flected in those assessments and thus in bank overhead and in the pricing
of bank services to consumers.92
C. State-level Enforcement
I. Overview and Background
In 1972, the National Commission on Consumer Finance observed that
state enforcement agencies were preoccupied with safety and soundness
considerations and not with consumer protection:
By conducting examinations directed toward ensuring bank
soundness, state examining forces are generally duplicating ef-
forts of the FDIC and the Board with regard to insured nonmem-
ber and state member banks, respectively. . . . Overemphasis
on soundness leaves other bank supervision functions, such as de-
tection of fraudulent and irregular consumer credit practices, a
poor second in the scale of priorities . . .9
A present evaluation indicates that little has changed94 and that, in light
of increases in state consumer legislation, the relative level of consumer
protection activities in the state bank supervisory agencies may have di-
minished.
With the exception of Massachusetts and perhaps New York, the state
banking agencies in the seven states devote little attention or resources to
90. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. 1 1977). See Rohner, supra note 1, at 7 n. 11.
91. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693-1693r (Supp. 1978). See Rohner, supra note 1, at 8 n.16.
92. These kinds of costs are related directly to the enforcement functions of the federal
and state banking agencies. There is, of course, a broader range of creditor costs involved in
complying generally with consumer protection laws, without reference to bank examinations
as such. As each new consumer law is passed, creditors need to review their practices, con-
sult counsel, reprint forms, reprogram computers, retrain personnel, establish monitoring
systems, and probably increase loss reserves. These costs are undoubtedly substantial, and
are upwardly affected by the proliferation of state and federal laws and regulations. Al-
though some efforts have been made to measure these costs in limited circumstances, see,
e.g., Exercise of Consumer Rights Under the Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair Credit Billing
Acts, 64 FED. RES. BULL. 363 (1978), their total is probably incalculable. See generally A.
HEGGESTAD, supra note 83.
93. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 9, at 53.
94. Much of the material that follows concerning the operations of state banking de-
partments derives from responses to questionnaires supplied to the FDIC or from follow-up
telephone discussions between those departments and FDIC staff. Where information is
amenable to conventional citation, the specific references will be made.
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explicit consumer protection activities. The state agencies acknowledged
little in the way of examiner expertise in consumer laws - two of the
states had no examiners with such expertise while three others had no
more than four such individuals. Separate compliance training, compli-
ance handbooks, and special examination visits are virtually unknown at
the state level.
In all but Massachusetts, consumer compliance examinations are only
incidental parts of the regular commercial examination. In several states it
appears the state officials receive and review copies of federal agency ex-
amination reports and treat this second-hand review as state-level enforce-
ment even though the federal examiners would have devoted virtually no
time to examining state law compliance. Additionally, there is little evi-
dence of formal complaint handling or educational efforts on the part of
the state bank supervisors. Even in Massachusetts, which has the most
aggressive enforcement program, those efforts are directed almost exclu-
sively at Truth in Lending95 and credit discrimination compliance.
The context in which state consumer compliance activity occurs deserves
restating. Only state-chartered banks are subject to state examination, thus
eliminating from consideration the large number of national banks with
their dominant proportion of consumer credit holdings.96 Except where a
state has been explicitly exempted from federal law, as in the case of Mas-
sachusetts for Truth in Lending, state officials have neither the responsibil-
ity nor the authority to examine for compliance with federal laws as such,
though some states have adopted federal requirements by reference or par-
allel enactment.97
The state agencies are responsible for state law only. Many states, in-
cluding several in the selected seven, have a fairly comprehensive body of
state laws applicable to consumer transactions. These laws may range
from assorted usury limitations to detailed limitations on bank agreements
and practices. 98 Thus, even though the compliance efforts of the federal
agencies have received considerable attention recently, it does not follow
that the protections afforded by state law are insignificant or not deserving
of enforcement; it is inappropriate to rationalize less vigorous enforcement
activity at the state level on the grounds of the unimportance of state laws.
While two of the seven target states - Virginia and North Carolina -
95. Massachusetts is exempted from the federal TIL. See Regulation Z, Supp. III, 12
C.F.R. § 226.55(d) (1979). For a discussion of the exemption mechanism, see Rohner, supra
note 1, at 31-32.
96. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
97. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKINo LAW § 353 (McKinney 1971).
98. See authorities cited in note 4 supra.
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have little in the way of statutory consumer protections applicable to banks
beyond traditional usury laws, even those laws are basic and longstanding
consumer protections against overcharging. Their complexities may be
lost on most individual consumers because of intricate computational rules
and because the resulting finance charge is disclosed as a Truth in Lending
APR, which may be a quite different number from that expressed in the
state usury law. Two of the states whose banking agencies appear least
active in consumer compliance - Kansas and Utah - have enacted the
UCCC, which contains numerous provisions affecting banks in matters of
rates, permissible contract terms, creditor remedies, credit insurance, and
the like. Other states - New York, Texas, and Massachusetts - have
enacted a variety of consumer protection measures either by law or admin-
istrative regulation. In all of these instances, consumers may properly ex-
pect equally thorough enforcement from both state and federal officials.
One of the barriers to more ambitious state enforcement against com-
mercial banks is the fact that each of the seven state bank agencies is re-
sponsible for supervising not just commercial banks but other institutions
as well - thrifts, credit unions, consumer finance and small loan compa-
nies, and the like. The number of these nonbank institutions subject to
supervision ranges from thirteen money order companies in Kansas, to 692
finance companies in North Carolina, to more than 2,000 nonbank com-
mercial entities in New York.99
A chronic difficulty at the state level is inadequate funding for the bank-
ing agency and allocation of available resources. The NCCF Report noted
that state-level staffs and budgets are generally inadequate for the task of
effective bank examination."c° But the Report then drew attention to a
seeming paradox by concluding that, despite the duplicative state and fed-
eral efforts to examine for safety and soundness, "it is likely that the state
agencies will direct whatever energy and funds they possess toward exam-
ining for soundness and ignore other matters such as detection of con-
sumer protection law violations."' 0 ' Thus, the Commission accurately
99. See CSBS REPORT, supra note 3, at 19-22.
100. NCCF REPORT, supra note 9, at 54. According to the Commission, few state bank-
ing agencies were doing any state consumer law enforcement whatsoever, their resources not
permitting any ambitious efforts. Since the federal agencies were doing an adequate job of
examining banks for soundness, it was difficult for state legislatures to justify appropriating
significant amounts for a duplicate effort or for auxiliary functions such as consumer protec-
tion. Id
101. Id. Other than commenting on the limited consumer protection role of state bank-
ing agencies, the NCCF Report did not suggest solutions nor make specific recommenda-
tions for change. As a result, the NCCF Report did not serve as impetus for changing the
programs of the state bank supervisors. Moreover, the state banking agencies have not been
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predicted that most state agencies would continue to give top priority to
safety and soundness at the expense of consumer protection activities.
Unlike the federal agencies, whose enforcement authority is often exclu-
sive with respect to banks within their jurisdiction, the state bank supervi-
sors may share enforcement authority with other state officials. Where the
state attorney general, for instance, conducts visible activity in this area,
there may be a tendency on the part of the bank supervisors to defer to
that office for necessary consumer protection. This same phenomenon
may occur where state civil rights commissions are charged with enforcing
antidiscrimination laws applicable to banks. Thus, the existence of alter-
nate enforcement agencies may be one factor contributing to the modest
level of effort by the bank supervisors. Another is the tradition of bank
agency concern for safety and soundness, that is, depositor protections
rather than borrower protections.
2 Specific Aspects of State Enforcement
State bank supervisors generally acknowledge responsibility to enforce
state consumer laws as part of their supervisory function, and all profess to
do so primarily through their bank examination procedures. Except for
Massachusetts, none of the seven states has established discrete consumer
compliance reviews. In fact, in these other six states, examination for con-
sumer law compliance is no more than an incidental part of regular com-
mercial exams.
Massachusetts alone has created a special corps of consumer examiners,
separately and specially trained, who conduct separate examinations for
compliance with state laws (including particularly the state Truth in Lend-
ing law).' °2 Special examination formats have been developed for TIL
subjected to the same oversight scrutiny in congressional hearings of the past several years as
have the federal banking agencies. Perhaps, therefore, the enforcement inertia in the states
is attributable to the lack of effective outside pressures for action at the state level.
102. See, e.g., House Oversight Hearings on TIL Enforcement, supra note 53, at 43-45
(statement of Commissioner Greenwald). In Massachusetts, which has a separate corps of
consumer examiners, there is more examiner manpower relative to the consumer holdings of
commercial banks. Based on the number of compliance examinations conducted at com-
mercial banks in Massachusetts, there was one compliance examiner for each $378 million
in state commercial bank holdings of consumer obligations. The ratio of state examiners to
bank holdings in Massachusetts, therefore, is comparable to that for federal examiners at
FDIC or the Board but again does not account for the many variables arising from the
number of banks, size of banks, and complexity of substantive law.
By contrast, officials in the remaining six states acknowledged that the allocation of staff
and examiner time to consumer laws was minimal. Until recent experiments in New York
with a new, comprehensive consumer compliance checklist, see note 103 and accompanying
text infra, "only incidental checks during commercial examinations" occurred. Again, ex-
cepting recent innovations in New York, none of the other five states provided examiners
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and for the state equal credit laws, and another is being designed for fair
credit reporting purposes. These separate consumer compliance exams
typically last three or four examiner days. During 1977, the Massachusetts
examiners conducted some 282 TIL compliance exams among commercial
and mutual savings banks and thirty-eight equal credit exams among those
same institutions. The Massachusetts bank commissioner has testified con-
cerning the thoroughness and depth of these examinations in contrast to
the levels of noncompliance previously detected by FDIC examiners.
Even so, while Massachusetts examiners are instructed to note violations
of other state laws, besides TIL and ECOA, no special examination is
scheduled for those laws, and they are apparently reviewed as incidental to
the more "visible" disclosure and antidiscrimination laws.
New York is also somewhat unique. Until recently, its examiners had
made only incidental checks for consumer compliance during the conduct
of regular commercial examinations. The Supervisor's office, however, has
developed a manual and set of questionnaires which examiners can use to
verify compliance with all state consumer credit laws affecting banks. This
package of materials has been used experimentally in several banks, and
the agency intends to begin training examiners in its use throughout the
state. 103
Beyond Massachusetts and New York, there are no apparent plans in
the other five states to change or expand their compliance examination
procedures.
a. Complaint Handling. Education
The pattern of state activity or inactivity in these areas is similar to that
involving compliance examinations. The five least active states, Kansas,
North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia, have no structured complaint
handling procedure within the banking agency. Several of those agencies
indicated that individual complaints would as likely be addressed to the
state attorney general as to them.
Massachusetts and New York again stand apart in their complaint pro-
cedures. In each state a separate division within the bank commissioner's
office is responsible for complaints, and each is staffed by seven or eight
any special consumer law training, consumer law manuals, checklists, or equivalent materi-
als.
103. The New York forms force examiners to review for compliance with all state laws,
including those applicable to dealer paper. Initially, these compliance forms will only be
used internally, as a means for examiners to record possible violations for later review by
office personnel. Additionally, the banks will not see these forms but will be advised by
letter of apparent violations.
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complaint handling specialists. In both instances, these offices deal with
complaints against all supervised institutions (not just banks). Conse-
quently, the New York complaint personnel may be spread thinner than
those in Massachusetts, which has fewer institutions with substantially
smaller holdings.
Educational efforts directed either toward banks or the public range
from nonexistent to modest among the seven states. In most, the state
agencies delegate personnel to speak to industry or consumer groups and
to respond to institutional or consumer inquiries. Several mentioned the
preparation of pamphlets and similar material. Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, has prepared a thirty-seven page "Pocket Credit Guide," which has
been extensively distributed, and also a monthly guide of prevailing an-
nual percentage rates which is carried in local newspapers. The New York
banking department has aided in the preparation of pamphlets concerning
the credit discrimination laws.
None of the states, except possibly Massachusetts, seems to have empha-
sized educational efforts or to have had particular success in generating
ongoing educational programs in institutions such as schools.
b. Remedies
Not surprisingly, the only state in which it is possible to describe and
evaluate remedies sought by the state bank supervisor for noncompliance
with consumer protection laws is Massachusetts. In the others, the only
apparent response to any detected violations would be an admonition in
the examination report to correct those violations in the future under
threat of possible cease and desist orders.
In Massachusetts, when the bank commissioner discovers overcharges in
the course of Truth in Lending compliance examinations, the affected cus-
tomers are notified and asked whether they wish to obtain a refund. Un-
less the customer waives the refund, the banks are then afforded an
opportunity to make the refund voluntarily. Where the creditor refuses to
comply or challenges the restitution instruction, the commissioner refers
the case to the state attorney general for appropriate action.'04
That Massachusetts has pursued remedies other than mere prospective
correction of violations is consistent with that state's generally aggressive
104. Using these procedures, the Massachusetts commissioner obtained restitution of
$137,600 from commercial, mutual savings, and cooperative banks through mid-1978. Con-
sumers waived their claims to an additional $97,000, and six cases involving $86,000 have
been referred to the attorney general. The total amount of detected overcharges by banks
and thrifts under the state's Truth in Lending law, therefore, is $320,600, based on the exam-
inations of 380 institutions.
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posture on consumer protection. Undoubtedly, the commissioner's office
is now viewed by banks more as an adversary than as a friendly and sup-
portive regulator of their safety and soundness. It seems clear that the
Massachusetts commissioner has seen that office as having a distinct obli-
gation to protect the consumers of bank services as well as bank depositors.
There is little evidence of comparable commitment or action in any of the
other six states.
3. Costs and Benefts of State Consumer Protection Activity
This subsection is necessarily brief, because there is both very little ac-
tivity to measure and even less information about the costs of that activity.
And, as in the discussion of costs and benefits of federal agency enforce-
ment activity, it is impossible to quantify consumer benefits beyond
amounts of refunds actually obtained.
Several examples demonstrate the futility of attempting precise calcula-
tions. In response to a direct question about the departmental expenses
attributable to enforcing consumer protection laws, a Texas spokesman re-
plied that they were "practically nil, maybe $15,000 - $20,000 a year." The
North Carolina spokesman could provide no figure whatever for consumer
compliance costs. Neither Kansas nor Utah ventured a figure for compli-
ance activity after acknowledging that their examiners spend virtually no
time on that detail.
Again, only Massachusetts' experience permits any approximation of di-
rect compliance expenditures. That state estimated that about twenty to
twenty-five percent of its total staff and examiner time was devoted to the
supervision of commercial banks. This translates to $705,000 to $880,000
out of the 1977 budget devoted to overall commercial bank supervision.
Assuming that twenty percent of that figure (commensurate with consumer
holdings as a percentage of all bank assets) is spent on consumer enforce-
ment, one can extrapolate an estimate of approximately $140,000 to
$175,000 as the departmental expenditure on consumer compliance for
commercial banks. A substantially smaller but perhaps more accurate
figure results if one focuses on the activity of the twenty-five consumer
specialists: compliance exams at commercial banks accounted for fourteen
percent of the work product of those twenty-five examiners in 1977. Those
examiners in turn constituted about 14.5% of the entire Massachusetts ex-
aminer corps. Thus, over two percent of the entire department's budget
was attributable to commercial bank consumer compliance activity. This
19801
Catholic University Law Review
figure would be $71,560.105
These estimates, however, are subject to considerable qualification and
clarification. As of 1978, the state of Massachusetts simply did not main-
tain records of precisely defined functional activities relating to the subcat-
egory of institutions known as commercial banks. Nonetheless, the
projected range of probable expenditures is not meaningless. It suggests
that banking department expenditures are substantially balanced by direct
returns to consumers in the form of restitutionary refunds. In addition,
during fiscal 1978, the Massachusetts Division of Banks recouped an addi-
tional $13,000 from commercial banks in fees for compliance exams.
Thus, from the perspective of those consumers who received restitution,
the agency costs of securing a remedy are probably less than the value of
the specific monetary remedy itself. This, of course, does not take into
account any valuation which might be placed on the intangible or psychic
benefits flowing to consumers from the correction of creditor practices
through agency compliance efforts.
From the banks' perspective, however, the costs of responding to agency
enforcement loom larger, for they must not only pay the restitution or
otherwise correct their violations but must also, through their assessments,
pay the expenses of the enforcement agency. These costs to the banks may
in turn be offset somewhat by the avoidance of private suit and attendant
litigation expenses. But it is not unfair to say that the bank's costs, which
must be reflected in their pricing, include the combination of the banks'
internal compliance costs, both preventative and corrective, and the ex-
penses of the supervisory agency.
As in the case of the federal agencies, if enforcement programs like that
in Massachusetts become widespread,"° with specific monetary correction
of past violations as well as prospective correction of future unlawful prac-
tices, the value of those programs to individual consumers will be signifi-
cant. At the same time, the cost of developing and maintaining the state
bank supervisory agencies to police institutional practices will not be in-
substantial and will of course be passed on to bank customers generally.
II. CONCLUSIONS, OPTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The dominant "problem" in the current system of enforcement of con-
105. These figures are based on handwritten responses to the FDIC questionnaire, and
thus, are not amenable to conventional citation.
106. It is worth noting that the 1978 elections in Massachusetts produced a new incum-
bent in the office of state bank commissioner. It is therefore uncertain whether or to what
extent the active programs initiated by the prior commissioner will continue.
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sumer protection laws can be simply stated. It is the duality of the two
distinct levels of consumer legislation and enforcement, one federal and
one state. Each hemisphere has its own sovereignty - Congress enacts
laws and the federal agencies enforce them; state legislatures pass laws and
state bank supervisors enforce those laws. Both bodies of law and enforce-
ment authority affect the identical transactions, the same consumers, and,
to a great extent, the same creditors.
This statement of the problem, however, largely begs the question.
There is no inherent reason why the enforcement of federal and state con-
sumer protection laws cannot be a smoothly meshed operation. At the
present time, it is not.
The problem is neither simple nor singular. Rather, there are a number
of difficulties, inefficiencies, and inconsistencies which are the products of
the side-by-side existence of multiple regulatory authorities. These
problems have arisen out of the haphazard and ad hoc growth of consumer
protection measures and enforcement structures. This growth pattern is
itself attributable in some degree to the rapid expansion of the consumer
marketplace over the past generation. Thus, with prosaic hindsight, we
can look at a marketplace regulated almost exclusively by the states and
local communities, with no felt need for broad protective rules beyond
those applicable to commerce generally and certainly with no special rea-
son to make those rules or their enforcement uniform from state to state.
The direct intervention of the federal government in regulating the con-
sumer credit marketplace, traceable only to 1968, has grown to where fed-
eral regulation clearly overshadows that of the states, threatening to reduce
the state role even further. As new substantive concerns have emerged, for
example, credit discrimination, computerized transaction handling, cus-
tomer privacy and the like, the fundamental protections have been enacted
at the federal level, often before state initiatives even begin. Concurrently,
the federal government has left significant regulatory aspects of the con-
sumer credit marketplace to the states - rate regulation principally, but
also large aspects of permissible contract terms, creditor security and col-
lection practices, and credit insurance.
Even within each of the regulatory spheres, federal and state, there are
sources of discordance. Substantive laws affecting banks emanate from
Congress, from each of the banking agencies, from the Board in certain
cases, and indirectly, from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Each of
the banking agencies undertakes its own enforcement program, until re-
cently unaffected by the operations at the others, in a setting clouded by
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some degree of inherent membership competitiveness. 0 7 The states go in
fifty directions at once as local conditions, local banking structures, and
local politics dictate. Moreover, the effort to forestall a federal takeover of
the consumer credit area by enacting uniform state laws has collapsed.
Not even the eleven states that have adopted a consumer credit code would
profess that there is any real uniformity among themselves.
While it is certainly true that uniformity is not inherently better than
diversity, there is presently an unhealthy overdiversification of consumer
credit regulation and enforcement. This lack of uniformity causes serious
compliance burdens for creditors who must respond to both federal and
state mandates on the same matters and special burdens for those creditors
who conduct multistate business operations and must, therefore, adjust
their otherwise standard practices to local requirements. The present mul-
tiplicity of regulatory and enforcement sources is also a cause of confusion
for consumers who are given combined state and federal disclosures ex-
pressly inconsistent from paragraph to paragraph. By shopping for
financial services across state lines or among national and state-chartered
institutions, consumers have different rights depending on where they
choose to bank. Additionally, consumers have no clear sense of where to
lodge their complaints.
Yet, at times both consumers and bankers prefer this diversity. Con-
sumer spokespersons can fight on two battlefronts: at the federal level for
minimum protections nationwide and in the state legislatures for responses
to local concerns. Bankers, too, opt for dualism where this provides them
with options: more "comfortable" enforcement policies at one level; better
interest rate or alternative mortgage possibilities at another level.'l 8 The
problem, therefore, is how best to balance the federal and state rules in
consumer protection for optimum fairness, effectiveness, and flexibility.
With this preface, the following suggestions are offered as possible op-
tions for improvement.
107. There has been much discussion recently of "charter switching"; that is, state banks
switching to national charter and vice versa. By switching charters, of course, the bank
changes its supervisory agency and controlling laws and regulations. For a more detailed
discussion of charter switching and the entire concept of dual banking, see Scott, The Dual
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
The practice of charter switching has resulted in a dwindling number of Federal Reserve
member banks, a subject addressed in current legislation. See, e.g., S. 85, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). These changes do not appear to have been prompted by the federal agencies'
consumer protection policies. Nonetheless, the federal agencies do not like to see their con-
stituencies dwindle.
108. See generally Scott, supra note 107, at 13-23.
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A. Applicability of Substantive Laws
1. Duplicative Laws
Efforts should be made to reduce the proliferation of duplicative, over-
lapping, and inconsistent federal, state, and agency rules for consumer
credit transactions. No one benefits when state and federal laws are incon-
sistent, when federal statutes cannot readily be integrated with each other,
when basic protections differ from state to state, or when federal and state
laws are altogether duplicative of each other.° 9 These situations generate
compliance burdens for creditors, enforcement dilemmas for the supervi-
sory agencies, and delayed or diluted benefits for consumers.
Although the goal of codifying and clarifying the crazy-quilt of existing
consumer credit laws may be readily agreed on, the alternative methods of
doing so are numerous. There are two extreme options and several inter-
mediate steps that might be taken.
a. Total Federal Preemption
Congress could occupy the entire field by enacting a comprehensive con-
sumer credit code which preempts state consumer credit laws. Politically,
this is a most improbable step. By producing strong states'-rights reac-
tions, Congress would be forced to handle the delicate matters of rates and
insurance. Such a federal code would necessarily reenact existing federal
laws, hopefully in a more integrated form. Further, it would need to con-
tain provisions of the scope contained in the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code and the Model Consumer Credit Act. To draw the necessary sup-
port, such legislation would need to contain both strong consumer protec-
tions to encourage consumerists to forego improving on federal laws in the
state legislature and reasonably high rates to compensate creditors for
compliance costs.
b. Federal Withdrawal
The opposite extreme would be for the federal government to withdraw
from consumer credit regulation altogether in favor of a carefully struc-
tured uniform act adopted by all the states. Aside from the unlikelihood of
this turnabout by Congress and the states, any such referral of consumer
109. There are a number of examples of these unfortunate by-products of uncoordinated
lawmaking: (1) a strong Florida ordinance was largely destroyed on grounds that it was
preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); (2) the mesh between the FCRA and
the ECOA with respect to credit histories is still unsettled; (3) Alden's, Inc. must now operate
differently in Illinois than in Pennsylvania with customers in one state paying more than in
the other. See Rohner, supra note 1, at 25-26 & nn.102, 103. Finally, in some cases, con-
sumers collect twice because one act by the creditor violates both federal and state law.
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credit regulation back to the states would probably require Congress to
retain some jurisdiction in areas that have distinct interstate dimensions -
EFTS, for example.
c. Nonpreemptive Federal Code
An alternative to either state or federal withdrawal would be the enact-
ment of a comprehensive federal code which would not broadly preempt
state law. That is, Congress might legislate minimum consumer protec-
tions across the whole range of consumer financial transactions but leave
the states free to enact consistent or more protective provisions as they saw
fit. Senator Proxmire at one time talked of introducing such legislation,
but never did so and has apparently discarded the idea.
This approach would satisfy consumerists who prefer to seek maximum
protection at both the federal and state levels. But it would still involve
substantial displacement or rewriting of existing state laws and would
probably create enormous regulatory burdens in sorting out which and to
what extent state laws remained viable. It would also have the effect of
increasing the duplication of coverage of federal and state laws.
d Modfied Preemption Rules
A more realistic intermediate step, which assumes that federal laws will
predominate but that the states will continue to have some regulatory role,
would be to adjust the preemption rules so that federal law more com-
pletely displaces state law on the same general subject matter. The discus-
sion above has noted the fluid and uncertain nature of the present
preemption rules, which preserve any state law not clearly "inconsistent"
with the federal or giving greater protection than federal law to the con-
sumer. The Board's regulations have grappled with these standards and
understandably have taken a cautious approach to preemption of state
law.
Criteria presently used to determine "inconsistency" include whether
state law requires different terminology and whether compliance with one
law constitutes a violation of the other. Mere redundancy of state and
federal law is not presently grounds for preemption. State law, however,
should be preempted whenever it is substantially duplicative of federal
protections. This would avoid the creditors' dilemma when there are mi-
nor differences between federal and state requirements. Additionally, it
would obviate the need for the anomalous "inconsistent state law" disclo-
sures now permitted under TIL, preclude possible double liability for a
single violation, and eliminate the need for both federal and state agencies
to examine for compliance. This adjustment would not entail any loss of
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consumer protections. First, states would be free to seek exemptions from
the federal law where state provisions are substantially the same or
stronger. Second, the reduced role for state enforcement should allow the
federal agencies to justify the resources needed to maintain strong enforce-
ment programs of their own.
It may be possible to devise other refinements in the present "inconsis-
tency" standard for state law preemption. For example, one industry-
sponsored draft of a preemption rule would have federal law displace any
state law unless: "the State or political subdivision requirement (A) pro-
vides significantly greater protection to the consumer than do the require-
ments imposed by [federal law] . . . , (B) is required by compelling local
conditions, and (C) does not unduly burden interstate commerce." "o The
draft then suggests that, in determining the burden on interstate com-
merce, the Board should consider technological feasibility, compliance
costs, the likelihood of similar state laws, and the need for a uniform na-
tional rule. 1 '
This approach adds several new criteria to the preemption test. Not
only must the state law give consumers greater protection, but it also must
be "significantly" greater protection. The state law must be "required" by
local conditions, yet not "unduly" burdensome on interstate commerce.
While these notions are philosophically a proper part of the preemption
issue, they are so subjectively value-laden as to be almost impossible oper-
ating standards. If read literally, they would probably leave no state con-
sumer laws intact. What local circumstances would "require" a state law
significantly different from the federal and not emulated elsewhere? Addi-
tionally, to the extent a state law gave significantly greater protection, it
would likely increase creditor compliance costs and thus burden interstate
commerce.
This approach has the additional effect of shifting the burden of proof to
the state wishing to keep its own law. Any state law concerning the same
acts or practices as a federal law would in fact be preempted, unless and
until the state satisfied the Board on the specified criteria. This procedural
obstacle might stifle state initiative, especially if the Board took a cautious
approach to granting state requests.
Still, suggestions such as these merit further thought. It would be help-
ful if the Board or a congressional committee, with the cooperation of state
officials, tested these criteria, laying them alongside state laws in several
110. See TIL Simpl4ication Hearings, supra note 55, at 642 (Consumer Bankers Associa-
tion proposed amendments to TIL).
111. Id.
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jurisdictions to gauge both the difficulty of their application and their
probable preemptive effect.
e. 'Limited Deference"
An alternate approach to clarifying the preemption rules is reflected in
the proposed Truth in Lending Simplification Act.' 1 2 Its value, however,
may be limited to the credit cost disclosure context. The bill would au-
thorize the Board, as now, to determine whether there are inconsistencies
in state law, but where such inconsistency is found, the creditor would be
barred from making the state disclosure and would be immunized from
liability for such omission. In addition, where the Board found that state-
required disclosures are "substantially the same in meaning" as TIL dis-
closures, creditors would be permitted to make disclosures in compliance
with state law instead of under TIL.
This provision, a kind of "limited deference" approach, would require
the Board to make line-by-line determinations about the status of state dis-
closure laws and could produce a disclosure statement where every other
item is dictated by federal law and the remainder by state law. This is not
conducive to a well-structured and meaningful disclosure scheme.
f Periodic Reviews
Without measurably disturbing the present balance of regulatory au-
thority between the states and the federal government, it would still be
desirable for each lawmaking body periodically to review its statutory and
regulatory consumer protection rules for clarity, internal consistency, and
effectiveness. The suggestion here is primarily for a periodic assessment of
the mechanical operation of the laws, but such reviews might well point
out substantive problems as well. An instance of this is the current pro-
posal for Truth in Lending Simplification, which originated in response to
concerns about the impracticability or ambiguity of certain TIL rules.
Along the way, the proposed act has become the vehicle for substantive
amendments." 13
This recommendation is based upon a simple legislative fact of life. In
the debate over the enactment of a particular law, its implications for the
future are never perfectly understood or expressed, nor is its relationship to
other existing laws worked out in great detail. The original TIL, for exam-
ple, failed to anticipate the furor over class actions or the question of as-
112. See S. 108, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1979) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1976)).
113. For example, the pending bill authorizes the enforcement agencies to seek restitu-
tion of overcharges, reduces the number of items to be disclosed, and limits civil penalties to
certain specified violations. See id §§ 8, It, 15.
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signee liability. It is ill-suited for dealing with variable rate mortgages,
open-end credit secured by real estate, and sundry other matters which
have come to light since 1968. The Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act 114 contains further anomalies: Title I (TIL) applies only to consumer
credit while Title VII (Equal Credit Opportunity) applies to all forms of
credit and the newly enacted Title IX (Electronic Fund Transfer Act) does
not apply to credit at all. The Board has regulation writing authority
under some titles, but no agency has that authority for several others.
At the state level, consumer protection provisions are often widely scat-
tered through the state codes. In addition, state laws accumulate over time
on a more piecemeal basis than federal laws. Historically acceptable pro-
visions may outlive their usefulness or may be found unacceptable on con-
stitutional or other policy grounds. Except for those states which
consciously adopt a comprehensive code, Kansas and Utah, for example,
the states rarely reexamine their own laws and only occasionally adjust
them to changes or new adoptions at the federal level.
It is easier to suggest regular monitoring and periodic evaluations of fed-
eral and state laws than to indicate how it can effectively be accomplished.
The Truth in Lending simplification experience shows that a reexamina-
tion of existing laws can involve an immense investment of time and re-
sources. Yet the expanded consumer affairs and legal offices in the federal
banking agencies contain a body of expertise and experience that might be
employed for this purpose, especially if there is some consolidation of the
enforcement functions of those agencies.
2. State Exemptions
In line with the recommendations concerning preemption rules, the
ground rules for states obtaining exemptions from federal laws should be
modified to permit exemptions only where they will demonstrably enhance
consumer protection. At present, states may qualify for an exemption for
"any class of credit transactions" within the state if they satisfy the Board
that the state law is "substantially similar" and that there is "adequate"
provision for enforcement." 5 While only a few states hold exemptions
from TIL, others have recently gotten exemptions from the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act,' 16 and one state's TIL exemption has just been ex-
114. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18 U.S.C.
(1976)). The CCPA has been amended various times since its enactment in 1968. See Roh-
ner, supra note 1, at 9 n.17.
115. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1976). See generally Rohner, supra note 1, at 31-32.
116. The states holding TIL exemptions are Maine, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut, and Wyoming. See Regulation Z, Supp. III, 12 C.F.R. § 226.55 (1979). California,
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tended to federally chartered credit unions, indicating that the exemption
device may be reviving." 17
So long as the Board insists that state law be virtually identical to the
federal, the net effect of an exemption is merely a shifting of enforcement
responsibility to state officials. From the state's point of view, this is desir-
able only when the state agency has the resources and the enforcement
program to produce greater protection for consumers than if the federal
agency retained jurisdiction. For the federal supervisory agency, an ex-
emption for a particular state means only that its examiners can omit a
portion of the usual exam format.
a. Abolish Exemptions
One option would be to abolish the exemptions outright, on the theory
that federal laws should be applicable nationwide without exception and
enforced uniformly by federal agencies. Even if this were done prospec-
tively, it is doubtful that the existing exemptions could be withdrawn with-
out cause.
b. Relax Exemption Rules
Instead of abolishing exemptions, an alternative would be to make them
easier to obtain, perhaps even automatic whenever state law is roughly
comparable to federal law. At present, the states must petition the Board
for exemptions. They bear the burden of demonstrating "substantial simi-
larity" of state law and the adequacy of state enforcement. If, however,
the political judgment is made that the states should have greater responsi-
bility for consumer protection, the criteria for exemptions might be relaxed
so that any "reasonably similar" state law would substitute for the federal
rule. In addition, the Board might review state laws and approve exemp-
tions on its own initiative without the formality of a state application. The
federal law and federal agency enforcement would simply become inappli-
cable in those states.
Under this policy, for example, a state credit disclosure law might qual-
ify for an exemption even though it did not require itemization of the
finance charge as under TIL. Similarly, a state credit discrimination law
applicable only to "consumer" credit might be exempted despite the fact
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York have received exemptions
under the HMDA. See 43 Fed. Reg. 7,476-77, 35,394 (1978) (New Jersey, Connecticut); 41
Fed. Reg. 55,581 (1976) (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York).
117. See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,973 (1978) (extension of Massachusetts TIL exemption). For a
discussion of the possible revival of the exemption device, see Connell, Federal Consumer
Credit Laws - An Opportunityfor States, 3 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 557 (1979).
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that the federal law has broader coverage. In this latter case, the federal
exemption standards might require an affirmative expression by the state
legislature of its judgment that antidiscrimination legislation is unneces-
sary in the nonconsumer area.
On this modified basis, there could be a substantially larger number of
state exemptions even without new state legislation." 8 These broader ex-
emptions would eliminate some of the redundancy of federal and state
laws and would relieve the federal agencies of significant enforcement du-
ties in those states.
There are significant weaknesses in this approach despite its value in
eliminating duplicative coverage. A standard of "reasonable similarity"
could operate to exempt state laws which were not as strong or as compre-
hensive as the federal, thus diminishing the scope of consumer protection
laws. In addition, to the extent enforcement became an exclusively state
concern, it would not likely be equivalent in vigor or thoroughness to the
compliance efforts of the federal agencies. Further, relaxed exemption
rules or automatic exemptions for any roughly comparable state law would
tend to reintroduce the crazy-quilt pattern of state laws that existed prior
to 1968, producing immense compliance burdens for interstate creditors.
c. Provide Exemptions only when Consumer Protection is Enhanced
Preferably, exemptions should be available on a more limited basis than
at present; that is, only when they will materially enhance consumer pro-
tection in the applicant state. This "enhancement" policy is certainly not
reflected in the present ground rules or in their application. At best, ex-
emptions are available on the principle that consumers will be no worse off
than under federal jurisdiction. At worst, exemptions once granted are
never closely reviewed despite possible changes in the state's enforcement
effort - the only withdrawal of an exemption came after a well-publicized
court decision declaring the state law unconstitutional." 9
In addition, exemptions presently are granted without reference to the
impact of new enforcement duties on the state agency's enforcement of
other state laws. When state officials take on the enforcement of federal
laws, they must allocate enforcement resources to that law. These re-
118. Among the seven states, for example, Kansas, New York, Utah, Texas, and Virginia
would all qualify for exemptions from TIL because they have enacted parallel laws or have
incorporated the federal provisions by reference. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 353 (Mc-
Kinney 1971). A number of the seven states would qualify for at least partial exemptions
from the ECOA; several more from the new Debt Collection Practices Act, and so on.
119. See 43 Fed. Reg. 35,100 (1978) (Illinois' exemption under the HMDA annulled).
See also Glen Ellyn Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Tsoumas, 71 111. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978)
(Financial Institutions Disclosure Act declared unconstitutional and void in its entirety).
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sources must come either from new funds or from other enforcement activ-
ity. Thus, exemptions would be appropriate only if they are not
accompanied by a commensurate reduction of other compliance efforts;
that is, if they do not unduly "drain" those efforts.
Experience with exemptions under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
suggests another test for whether the exemption enhances consumer pro-
tection. The federal HMDA is a narrow statute requiring only limited
institutional recordkeeping on the location of its home mortgage loans.
Some states, however, have enacted broader antiredlining laws, of which
recordkeeping is only a part.' 20 States have sought exemptions so that the
whole antiredlining structure can operate as an integrated whole under
state supervision. It would be appropriate for the Board, in considering
exemption applications, to consider expressly whether the state's desire to
supervise that aspect of state law is an important part of a larger consumer
protection effort; that is, the state's need for the exemption to accomplish
that larger objective.
d Partial Exemptions
The present exemption provisions extend to "classes of transactions."
The Board has effectively read these to mean classes of creditors. Until
recently, each exemption applied only to state-chartered institutions. No
exemption, however, differentiates by aspects of creditor activity. For ex-
ample, none cover closed-end but not open-end transactions or exempt
credit disclosure but not rescission rights. If the purpose of the exemption
provisions is to permit states to act where there are local needs and en-
forcement capabilities, it would be useful to permit exemptions more tai-
lored to local conditions.' 2'
To encourage states to adopt more protective local rules without having
to undertake wholesale enforcement responsibility, as for all of TIL or all
of ECOA, the Board could encourage and grant applications for narrow
exemptions from specified provisions of federal law. It could also grant
exemptions for specified portions of a bank's consumer portfolio so long as
120. Compare 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976) with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16F-I to
17:16F-11 (West Supp. 1979).
121. For example, a state's strong interest in redlining practices might give its bank ex-
aminers special expertise in real estate credit transactions; that expertise along with appro-
priate state legislation might justify exemptions from ECOA and TIL for mortgage loans,
but not for other forms of closed-end or open-end credit. Additionally, a state might wish to
examine all automobile paper for compliance with TIL and other state rules. With only the
present exemptions as guides, exemptions for specified types of transactions would be un-
precedented.
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such carving out does not result in duplicative or disruptive examinations
and does not undermine the overall effectiveness of the federal law.
e. National Banks and Exemptions
Virtually all of the state exemptions approved by the Board exclude
from their coverage national banks and other federally chartered institu-
tions.'22 This limitation is based on the asserted immunity of such institu-
tions from state visitorial powers. Since state officials are not authorized to
examine national banks, the state is unable to demonstrate that there is
adequate provision for enforcement, a statutory prerequisite for the ex-
emption. 12
3
The result of this differential treatment of state and federally chartered
institutions is bifurcated enforcement of a law that is "substantially simi-
lar" in its federal and state versions. Bifurcated enforcement can quickly
become uneven enforcement, with either the federal or state agency taking
a more thorough or aggressive supervisory role. This makes the level of
consumer protection in those states depend on whether the customer hap-
pens to bank at a national or state-chartered institution.
This article discusses the general question whether state officials ought
to have examination or similar supervisory authority for federally
chartered institutions and concludes that they should. The point here,
however, is narrower: where a state otherwise qualifies for an exemption
from federal law, that exemption should extend to all institutions, regard-
less of charter; the exemption should not be artificially split on the basis of
the purported "exclusivity" of the federal agency's examination authority.
Thus, there is no reason that an otherwise proper exemption should not
carry with it the necessary grant of authority for state officials to supervise
compliance by federally chartered institutions. This may require statutory
amendment or explicit agreement between the pertinent state and federal
supervisory agencies."'
3. Preemption and Exemption Rules in Rulemaking
Although the Board has not yet issued any "unfair and deceptive prac-
122. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.55 (1979) (TIL exemptions excluding federally chartered
institutions). Recently, the NCUA delegated enforcement authority to Massachusetts state
officials with respect to federally chartered credit unions, and the Board promptly extended
the state's exemption to those institutions. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.55(d) (1979); 43 Fed. Reg.
49,973 (1978).
123. See 12 U.S.C. § 2805(b) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 1666j(b) (1976).
124. This, for example, has been done between the Massachusetts bank commissioner
and the NCUA for federal credit unions. See note 122 supra.
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tices" regulations under the authority of section 18(f) of the FTC Act,125 it
is likely that they will do so in the future. 126 In order to avoid the kinds of
preemption questions that have arisen under similar FTC trade regulation
rules, it would be desirable for any such Board regulations to contain ex-
plicit preemption rules similar to those recommended above with respect
to federal legislation; that is, the federal rules should displace inconsistent
or duplicative state requirements.
Similarly, it would be desirable to have the same possibilities for state
exemptions from any section 18(f) regulations as for exemptions from fed-
eral statutes. A comparable exemption provision should be applicable to
any unfair practices regulations. The grant of authority in section 18(f) is
probably broad enough to permit the Board to draft any such regulation
with an exemption mechanism built into it. 127
4. Multqle Rulemaking by Federal Agencies
Although not constituting a direct federal-state issue, a further contrib-
uting factor to the lack of synchronization in consumer protection is the
multiple sources of substantive lawmaking at the federal level. While
Congress enacts the formal legislation, additional rulemaking of great
daily importance to banks and consumers occurs in each of the three bank
agencies and indirectly through the FTC.
There is no clearer example than the FTC's Holder Rule, 128 that effec-
tively exposes banks to broad liabilities arising from dealer sales. From
the FTC's point of view, the Holder Rule is a necessary exercise of its
statutory duty to regulate dealers, even though it has a "spill-over" effect
on banks. The Board, however, objected that banks were affected by a rule
that the bank supervisory agencies had no part in drafting.
Similarly, different agencies have different orientations toward the needs
and problems of the institutions they supervise. The FTC has suggested
interpretations of Regulation B that the primary regulator, the Board, has
125. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f (1976).
126. For a discussion of the Board's authority under § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1976),
see Rohner, supra note 1, at 10-11.
127. Under § 18(f), the Board has the authority to "prescribe regulations to carry out the
purposes of [§ 18(f)], including regulations defining with specificity such unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, and containing requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such
acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1) (1976). Since other consumer protection laws per-
mit exemptions, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C § 2805(b) (1976) (HMDA), the Board could argue that
the mandate of § 18(f) to protect against unfair and deceptive practices also allows for regu-
lations containing exemption mechanisms.
128. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1979). See Rohner, supra note 1, at 11, 12.
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found groundless. I2 9 OCC has felt the need for EFTS guidelines, but the
other bank agencies have not. FDIC and OCC issue regulations on racial
data notations, but the Board does not. The Board is the primary inter-
preter and regulation writer for ECOA, yet the Comptroller's Office inde-
pendently writes advisory letters to national banks.'3 °
The desirability of this multiple agency rulemaking depends on one's
perspective. On the positive side is healthy competitiveness, permitting
one agency to deal flexibly with the particular problems of the industry
segment it regulates. Initiatives or imaginative activity at one agency may
spur similar activity at another. Additionally, there is less chance of a cen-
tralized rulemaking agency becoming lethargic or an industry captive. On
the other side, the multiplicity of federal agency rulemaking causes some
problems. Similar transactions are treated differently depending on which
agency has jurisdiction over the bank, thus creating an uneven compliance
burden and uneven consumer protection. Interagency frictions are gener-
ated when one agency "interprets" a law differently from the other, espe-
cially if one is assigned primary regulatory authority under that law. At
times, the pronouncements or enforcement activities of one agency appear
to impose compliance requirements at odds with those adopted by another,
creating a real conflict in precedents.
"Functional" regulation, that is, centralized rulemaking by subject mat-
ter for all industries, has apparently worked well in some cases (SEC), not
so well in others (OSHA or DOE). "Segmented" rulemaking has tradi-
tionally been the norm in the banking field but has arguably not worked so
well elsewhere. It is not necessary to choose between the two regulatory
approaches in the abstract. The problem is simply that there are too many
federal agencies involved in consumer credit rulemaking without clear ju-
risdictional lines between them or coordination of their efforts.' 3 ' The
situation is not one of regulatory flexibility but of positive interagency fric-
tion and mistrust plus all the inequities of uneven consumer protection
policies.
129. See Rohner, For Lack of a National Policy on Consumer Credit.- Preliminary
Thoughts on the Needfor Unified FederalAgency Rulemaking, 35 Bus. LAW. 135 (1979).
130. See, e.g., [1977] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) $ 42,091-96.
131. Even the moderate NCCF REPORT recognized a need for more centralized con-
sumer credit regulation at the federal level. It recommended the creation of either a Bureau
of Consumer Credit within an umbrella Consumer Protection Agency, or, failing that, a
separate Consumer Credit Agency. Such a bureau or agency was to have full statutory
authority to issue rules and regulations and to supervise all examination and enforcement
functions under the CCPA. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 9, at 58-59.
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
a. Total Centralization
The most radical form of centralization would be the creation of the
kind of agency recommended by the NCCF Report' 32 in 1972. Its regula-
tory powers would run far beyond banks to all institutions engaged in pro-
viding consumer financial services. This agency would necessarily
displace the present consumer credit regulatory functions of the five agen-
cies supervising depository institutions, the FTC, and presumably the Sec-
retary of Labor (with respect to garnishment), the Secretary of HUD (with
respect to RESPA and Fair Housing), and components of sundry other
existing agencies.
The primary advantage of such an agency would be the placing of all
administrative regulation and rulemaking in the hands of a single author-
ity having a comprehensive view of the entire marketplace of consumer
financial services. Its focus would be exclusively on consumer protection
without the concurrent responsibilities of regulating in other conflicting
areas. Where uniform standards are necessary, this agency could develop
and adopt them without the time-consuming sifting and resifting that an
interagency task force inevitably requires.
There are, however, disadvantages in placing all regulation of consumer
financial services in a single agency. There could be bitter internecine
struggles in and among existing agencies to see whose personnel and ideol-
ogies would survive and dominate the new organization. A monolithic
regulatory structure conceivably might be "captured" by the industry or
otherwise fail to maintain a strong consumer protection posture. The task
of the agency might prove so vast that what are presently interagency con-
flicts would revive as intraagency differences. Additionally, there might be
cause for new frictions between the agency regulating consumer financial
services and the old-line supervisory agencies responsible for safety and
soundness.
On balance, it is submitted that the advantages outweigh the disadvan-
tages. Consumer credit and debit transactions have become a significant
part of our economy, and any given transaction may involve banks and
nonbanks acting in concert. ' 33 Further, any major consolidation of regula-
tory powers should be done by constituting a new regulatory body rather
than by giving all authority to an existing agency. The new agency would
have distinct advantages: a fresh charter unencumbered by any existing
agency's narrow perspectives or vested interests; high public expectations
132. See note 131 supra.
133. For example, banks buy dealer paper, process merchants' credit card drafts, supply
information to, and use credit reporting agencies.
[Vol. 29:313
Regulation of Consumer Financial Services
as a prod to action; and the organizational freedom to "write on a clean
slate." None of the existing agencies except the Board has much experi-
ence in regulating creditors other than the ones it directly supervises, and
the Board has regulatory authority over nonbanks only with respect to im-
plementing regulations for certain specific federal statutes. To keep the
new agency vital, it might be subject to a "sunset" provision or be required
to constitute an advisory board containing representatives of all interested
industry and public groups.
b. Centralization of Rulemakingfor Depository Institutions
A less ambitious centralization plan might combine the regulatory pow-
ers over all depository institutions in the same way the recently created
Financial Institutions Examination Council (Council) does for examina-
tion powers. Instead of giving that Council merely the power to prescribe
standard examination practices, its authority might be broadened to make
it the exclusive source of consumer regulations, interpretations, guidelines,
and the like for all deposit-making institutions.
The advantages of this approach include the fact that it is a less drastic
reorganization. It also could be "phased in" more readily by building onto
an existing Council structure. The more homogeneous nature of the de-
posit-holding institutions should allow this regulatory entity to achieve an
easier consensus on regulatory and enforcement needs. The Council
would have a healthy dual function: to issue regulations and rules and to
supervise the actual enforcement operations of the five agencies. On the
other hand, frictions with other agencies, such as the FTC, could reappear
or continue.
c. Centralization in an Existing Agency
Another alternative for centralizing all rulemaking authority for deposi-
tory institutions would be to designate one of the five existing agencies as
the exclusive rulemaking and interpretive body while denying the other
four agencies any such authority. This would have the effect of preventing
conflicting, inconsistent, or more onerous rules from issuing separately
from each agency.
The logical agency for this centralization would be the Board since it
already bears the major regulatory responsibility under the CCPA and has
chafed at what it sees as unwarranted incursions into its regulatory role by
the other agencies. But there is reason to doubt the wisdom of resolving
present frictions by declaring one of the interested parties the out-and-out
victor. The reaction from the other agencies to the enhancement of the
Board's authority at the expense of their own could be smoldering resent-
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ment or stifled enforcement initiative. In addition, the Board does not
enjoy the reputation among consumer groups of having the most vigorous
consumer protection policies. Vesting all regulatory authority in the
Board's hands could be perceived as a weakening of the federal commit-
ment in that regard.
d Rulemaking Centralizationfor Commercial Banks
A fourth and more limited centralization approach would be to combine
the consumer protection regulatory functions of the three agencies that
deal with commercial banks. Given recent efforts toward cooperative en-
forcment programs by those agencies, it would be a relatively modest step
to consolidate their regulatory roles officially and structurally. Such a con-
solidation might be achieved by assigning this new function to the Council
or by independent legislation. Nevertheless, the responsible body would
need greater autonomy and authority than the present Interagency Coordi-
nating Committee. It might also be accomlished by designating the cur-
rent dominant regulator, the Board, as the exclusive source of consumer
rules and regulations for commercial banks, but this alternative has most
of the shortcomings discussed above.
5. Applicability of State Law to National Banks
There has been a measure of continuing uncertainty about the applica-
bility of state consumer protection laws to federally chartered institutions,
particularly national banks. So long as the states are allotted a role in the
regulation of consumer credit, as they are presently, either the Congress or
the OCC ought to state explicitly that local laws of the types embodied in
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or in state enactments paralleling fed-
eral laws are fully applicable to such institutions.
It was noted above that their federal charter does not immunize national
banks from state law provisions regulating financial transactions. There is
no inherent conflict between state consumer protection laws and the func-
tioning of national banks as so-called "federal instrumentalities." Al-
though the OCC has usually agreed with this proposition when specific
questions of applicability arose, it would be helpful for the OCC to adopt
and publicize a policy whereby state consumer protection laws would be
presumed applicable to national banks for purposes of compliance and en-
forcement. This "presumption of applicability" would be overcome only
by the clearest evidence that such state law truly interfered with important
functions of the bank under its federal charter.
This article has previously discussed the special questions arising under
the National Bank Act with respect to the applicable interests rates when
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national banks operate across state lines.'3 4 Marquette National Bank v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. "' openly invites Congress to consider the
need for specific modifications in the "most favored lender" doctrine that
has provided national banks with significant advantages over state-
chartered creditors. The 115-year-old National Bank Act provisions were
written without contemplation of the kinds of interstate activity in which
banks now engage; it is therefore unwise to construe that Act in such a way
as to encourage interstate warfare between national banks and all other
credit grantors. It may be that a congressional overhaul of the statutory
provisions on permissible rates for national banks is in order. The options
to be considered in such a process would include: codifying the apparent
holdings of Marquette National Bank and other cases 136 that national
banks can charge the highest rate permitted either in their home states or
in the state of the customer's residence; limiting national banks to rates
permitted state institutions in the jurisdiction where the customer lives; or
enacting a preemptive federal usury law for national banks. None of these
are unqualifiedly good alternatives. The first promotes predatory practices
by large national banks, the second undercuts the traditional notion of na-
tional banks as "most favored lenders," and the third overturns the Na-
tional Bank Act's own policy of deferring generally to state usury laws.
The third, however, may be the most attractive choice, assuming it is polit-
ically possible to agree on a structured set of rates for the various kinds of
credit transactions ranging from credit card plans to home mortgages.' 37
B. Allocation of Enforcement Duties
At the present time, with substantive consumer protection laws emanat-
ing from both federal and state governments, there is a distinct separation
of enforcement responsibilities between supervisory agencies at the two
134. See Rohner, supra note 1, at 35-38.
135. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
136. See Fisher v. National Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v.
National Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
137. In fact, such a preemptive general usury law for national banks already exists
though it has a limited operational effect. Section 85 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §
85 (1975), permits national banks to charge
at a rate of I per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial
paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the
bank is located, or in the case of business or agricultural loans in the amount of
$25,000 or more, at a rate of 5 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-
day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve
district where the bank is located . ..
id, if higher than the otherwise applicable state rates. This provision was invoked by na-
tional banks in New York during a recent mortgage money crunch.
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levels. Essentially, federal agencies enforce federal law, state agencies
state law. While it is theoretically possible that either the federal govern-
ment or the states might withdraw altogether from the regulation of con-
sumer financial services, such a possibility is remote. Even with explicit
recognition of the predominant lawmaking role of Congress and the fed-
eral agencies and even with the adoption of the preemption and exemption
rules recommended above, the states will properly want and demand some
share in the enactment and enforcement of consumer protection laws.
Thus, there is a basic assumption that, for the foreseeable future, any reor-
dering of enforcement duties will have to permit both the federal and state
governments a policing role. Beyond this premise, however, are a number
of possible adjustments to make overall consumer enforcement more effi-
cient and more evenhanded.
1 Consolidation of Federal Agency Enforcement Programs
No matter what is done to delineate more clearly the respective roles of
federal and state bank supervisory agencies, definite benefits could accrue
from some consolidation of, or greater coordination between, the federal
enforcement agencies themselves. Enforcement authority under most of
the federal consumer protection laws is scattered among eight or nine
agencies. 38 The three bank supervisory agencies each have an indepen-
dent enforcement function, and each of those agencies has separately cre-
ated and maintained the full complement of enforcement resources -
training, materials, regional office consumer specialists, examiners, com-
plaint-handling procedures, and the like. Unsynchronized federal-level
enforcement simply exacerbates the unevenness of the combined federal
and state efforts.
Some measure of increased coordination of enforcement will result from
the recent creation of the Financial Institutions Examination Council,
whose authority encompasses the FHLBB and NCUA as well as the three
banking agencies. 139 The powers of this Council are modest, however, and
do not contemplate the physical or organizational consolidation of the
staffs and programs of the existing agencies. Moreover, the Council does
not have jurisdiction over other federal agencies having substantial en-
forcement duties for nondepository institutions, such as the FTC.
a. Single Federal Enforcement Agency
As discussed in connection with centralizing federal agency rulemaking
138. See Rohner, supra note I, at 14-16, Appendix A.
139. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
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authority, it would be possible to locate all federal consumer protection
enforcement responsibility in a single new agency. The broadest form of
centralization would consolidate into one agency both the rulemaking and
enforcement functions of all the federal agencies currently sharing in the
supervision of institutions offering consumer financial services.
140
Aside from its political unacceptability, this "ultimate centralization"
option has other drawbacks. The relocation and restaffing involved in cre-
ating a new enforcement agency would undoubtedly be expensive, time-
consuming, and disruptive of enforcement continuity. Perhaps more im-
portantly, in the case of the bank supervisory agencies, it would place in
separate agencies the responsibilities for supervising consumer compliance
and safety and soundness. Banks would be subject to examination by per-
sonnel of the new agency and also by regular examiners from the banking
agency. Potential frictions would abound, and the reservoir of bank
agency knowledge and expertise arising from its concern for safety and
soundness could not directly influence the new consumer agency's enforce-
ment policies. One can doubt both the practicability and the wisdom of
this approach.
b. "'Bureau of Consumer Credit"
The complete centralization of federal agency enforcement suggested
above is more drastic than that contemplated by the National Commission
on Consumer Finance in 1972. Its recommendation was for a new agency
that would oversee, but not replace, the enforcement activities of existing
agencies. 4 ' This "Bureau of Consumer Credit" would essentially super-
vise the supervisors. It would also have centralized rulemaking authority
and extensive investigatory powers. It would be autonomous in its law-
making function but dependent on existing agencies to carry out its en-
forcement directions.
An organizational structure along the lines suggested by the NCCF has
as much to recommend it today as it had seven years ago. Its desirability
has in a sense been confirmed by the creation of the Financial Institutions
Examination Council. There is no compelling reason, however, why a co-
ordinating body for the enforcement of consumer credit laws should be
limited to depository institutions. Indeed, there is no reason why a body
140. For example, personnel from existing agencies would be relocated into a new
agency, or new personnel would be hired to staff the new agency, and all existing agencies
would be discharged from any further authority or duty in the consumer protection area.
Both the rulemaking and compliance examination functions of the three bank agencies
would be transferred to the new agency.
141. See note 131 supra.
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like the NCCF's "Bureau of Consumer Credit" could not coexist with the
new Council - the latter as a coordinating body for all examination func-
tions respecting depository institutions while the former would supervise
the overall enforcement of laws affecting the whole area of customer
financial services. More than anything else, this Bureau would provide the
measure of "quality control" presently lacking among both the federal and
state enforcement efforts.
The NCCF identified other important functions beyond coordination of
federal agency enforcement programs this "Bureau" would perform. One
would be to monitor the adequacy of state enforcement for which the Bu-
reau would require some authority to investigate or require reports from
state officials. A second function, whose importance is further developed
below, would be to serve as a clearing house for, and a provider of, techni-
cal assistance to states to enhance the quality of their enforcement pro-
grams.14
2
c. Combined Enforcementfor Depository Institutions
Another form of consolidation among the federal enforcement agencies
would be to combine the enforcement programs either of all five deposi-
tory-institution supervisory agencies or at least of the three commercial
bank agencies. This envisions the creation, out of the existing personnel
and programs of the several agencies, of a single pool of consumer compli-
ance examiners with a single support and training structure. Since all of
these agencies enforce virtually the same body of consumer protection
laws and since consumer compliance will rarely impact on safety and
soundness, the only rationale for maintaining five or three separate police
forces is the historically separate responsibility of each agency for its seg-
ment of the credit-granting industry.'43
This consumer compliance pool could operate under the aegis of the
Financial Institutions Examination Council. Each of the five or three
agencies would assign a number of its examiners to work either regularly
or for some specified period of time as "Federal Consumer Compliance
Officers" under the direction of the Council. The Council would provide
the training programs, examination materials, and report forms and would
coordinate the scheduling of compliance examination through the regional
offices of the respective agencies. The Council, or its compliance arm,
142. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 9, at 59.
143. Senator Proxmire has championed the idea of a single bank regulatory agency. See,
e.g., S. 332, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Thus far, he has been unsuccessful. The proposal
here is merely to combine the consumer protection functions of the OCC, the FDIC, and the
Board.
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should also have responsibility to review and evaluate compliance exam
reports, recommend any necessary follow-up administrative action to the
agency involved, and maintain a centralized data bank on exam results,
patterns and types of violations, and similar matters - data that would be
useful both in monitoring examination effectiveness and in identifying un-
fair or deceptive practices appropriate for treatment by regulation.
This centralized compliance force might also handle consumer com-
plaints regarding any bank or depository institution. In theory, this three-
legged or five-legged unit might also be delegated the authority to initiate
cease and desist or similar administrative proceedings against violators on
behalf of whichever agency was the primary supervisor.
This kind of unified enforcement program would not necessarily pro-
duce dramatic reductions in the total manpower needed for consumer
compliance. Indeed, every examiner currently doing consumer compli-
ance would probably be assured of a continuing job. Rather, the econo-
mies would lie in the training and support services, where only a single set
of materials, manuals, report forms, and a single training curriculum
would be needed. There would likely be other intangible benefits as well.
With all bank consumer compliance under one roof, for example, it should
be easier to share among all examiners lessons learned by experience, spe-
cial skills developed by certain examiners, or special investigative tech-
niques without loss of such information by filtration through the
hierarchies of three or five separate compliance shops.
The creation of a combined examiner force for banks or for all deposi-
tory institutions is not inconsistent with the creation of the recommended
Bureau of Consumer Credit. The Bureau would supervise enforcement as
to all categories of credit grantors - banks and others - but execution of
enforcement programs themselves would be through existing line agencies.
d Role of the Financial Institutions Examination Council
Even if nothing else is done in the way of consolidating federal agency
enforcement efforts, the authority of the Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council clearly includes the establishment of uniform examination
standards among the five agencies supervising depository institutions. In
addition, the Council is charged to "make recommendations for uniform-
ity in other supervisory matters," which could encompass complaint han-
dling, educational programs, and other supervisory techniques that do not
rely on formal bank examinations. An obvious recommendation is that
the Council lend its weight and authority to development of effective, uni-
form consumer compliance programs.
The act creating the Council is silent on the Council's duty or authority
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to consult regularly with federal agencies other than the five agencies
supervising financial institutions.'44 Because there has been some measur-
able friction between the banking agencies (especially the Board) and the
FTC on enforcement policies, the Council ought to maintain an open, reg-
ular liaison with the FTC with respect to the enforcement of consumer
protection laws. Similar relationships might be maintained with other
agencies - Justice, for example, with respect to ECOA enforcement - as
the need warrants. Those agencies need not be given a formal voice in
Council decisions, but their mutual and concurrent enforcement responsi-
bilities should be openly recognized.
2. A Federal-State Contract Structure
The federal and state agency consumer compliance programs, now oper-
ating virtually independently, should be brought together in an integrated,
cooperative joint venture for optimum efficiency and maximum consumer
protection. In this connection, the authority of the federal banking agen-
cies to supervise compliance with state consumer protection laws should be
confirmed, and the agencies should adopt affirmative policies and pro-
grams to assure that banks under their jurisdiction are complying with
state laws. At the same time, Congress should consider giving state offi-
cials the authority to enforce federal consumer laws, not in a way that
would be duplicative of federal agency efforts but rather in a way that
would permit the federal and state agency consciously to agree on a fair
division of enforcement duties between them. The federal agencies should
then be authorized and encouraged to enter into agreements with the state
bank supervisors allocating the responsibility for consumer enforcement
between them. The framework for these federal-state agreements should
take into account the comparative resources of the state and federal agen-
cies, the relative complexity of state law, the willingness of state officials to
accept or purchase technical assistance from the federal agency, the possi-
ble loan or exchange of examiners or other compliance personnel, and, in
general, the ability and desire of the agencies at each level to handle ade-
quately the enforcement duties for both state and federal laws. 145
a. Federal Agencies Enforcing State Law
Part I of this article describes the broad grant of authority in the Finan-
144. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-3308 (Supp. 1979).
145. The suggestions just made involve a somewhat complex mesh of component judg-
ments and recommendations. The ultimate objective, however, is to change the aloofness
that presently characterizes the federal and state roles in consumer protection into a positive
program of cooperation and mutual support.
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cial Institutions Supervisory Act (FISA) for each of the federal banking
agencies to commence cease and desist proceedings for the violation of
"any" law or regulation.'46 While arising out of concern for the institu-
tion's safety and soundness, the FISA was also intended to permit the
agencies to protect the good name, the "image," of banking generally.
There is ample room within the statutory mandate for the agencies to po-
lice compliance with many types of state laws.
It would be helpful if amendments to the FISA would make more ex-
plicit the authority of the federal agencies to enforce state consumer laws.
Moreover, the NCCF Report concludes that, as the FISA is currently writ-
ten, the authority exists.' 47 The federal agencies, however, have only very
grudgingly acknowledged any responsibility to examine for state law com-
pliance; what they do review does not extend beyond usury violations.
The federal banking agencies should consider adopting and publicizing
a policy that all applicable state consumer laws fall within the purview of
the agencies' enforcement program. This policy would be essentially an
affirmation of the agency's authority; it would not necessarily or immedi-
ately mean a doubling or tripling of the agency's enforcement efforts. The
purpose of this recommended expression of policy is to provide a basis for
more cooperative efforts with state officials along the lines developed be-
low.
b. State Agencies Enforcing Federal Law
At present, state officials lack explicit authority to police compliance
with federal consumer laws even if they have the resources and the desire
to do so. In theory, state bank supervisors might examine for compliance
with federal laws because such compliance measurably affects safety and
soundness, but there does not appear to be any instance in which state
supervisors have done this. The only way state officials can effect an en-
forcement role for themselves with respect to federal laws is if the state
adopts the federal provisions as state law either by reference' 48 or by par-
allel legislation. Or, if the state adopts a law "substantially similar" to
federal law, it may obtain an exemption from the federal provisions and
take over enforcement responsibility from the federal agencies. 149 Other-
wise, state enforcement of federal rules incorporated by reference into state
law duplicates federal agency enforcement.
The notion of delegating to state agencies the authority to enforce duties
146. See Rohner supra note 1, at 16-19.
147. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 9, at 53.
148. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 226.55 (1979) (state exemptions to TIL).
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arising under federal laws is not unprecedented, 50 and Congress might
well consider enacting a limited form of such a "parens patriae" delegation
in the consumer protection area. That is, the appropriate state officials
having jurisdiction over the various classes of credit-granting institutions
in the state would be authorized to use existing state enforcement machin-
ery, such as examinations and cease and desist proceedings, to seek com-
pliance with applicable federal statutory requirements. This authority
would lie unless state law expressly denied it to state officials.
As in the case of the recommendation in (a) above, the purpose of this
delegation would not be to shunt to state officials the enforcement burden
now borne by the federal agencies. In no way should the federal agencies
relax or remit their efforts. The purpose of this delegation, instead, would
be to create parity between federal and state officials in the scope of their
enforcement powers. Both federal and state agencies would have the legal
capacity to enforce the full package of laws applicable to consumer trans-
actions within those states. This equilibrium would then permit a deliber-
ate and open assessment by the agencies involved of how this shared
authority should in fact be divided in any given state.
c. Federal-State Enforcement Contracts
If, as recommended, both the federal and state agencies are authorized
to enforce all applicable consumer protection laws, a system is needed to
produce an efficient and fair allocation of those duties between agencies at
both levels of government. The system should have as its dominant goals:
(1) the avoidance of duplication or gaps in the overall enforcement of con-
sumer laws; (2) the assurance of even and vigorous consumer protection;
(3) maximum use of the body of consumer law expertise developed by the
federal agencies; and (4) due recognition of the enforcement roles of the
state. The following specific ingredients might be included in such a sys-
tem:
(1) "Consumer Enforcement Resource Center"
There should be established at the federal level a strong resource capac-
ity to provide the state agencies with technical assistance in the form of
training, materials, data systems, and personnel such as examiner trainers
or supervisors and complaint specialists. This resource office would sup-
plement the support staff needed for federal enforcement alone and would
150. For example, the environmental protection laws often contain mechanisms for a
negotiated "delegation" of federal enforcement to states. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(c)(1)
(1976).
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certainly require new sources of funds. The "Consumer Enforcement Re-
source Center," to give it a name, would be an arm of whatever centralized
federal enforcement authority created under earlier recommendations, or,
failing any such new agency, the resource center could be developed as
part of the newly created Financial Institutions Examination Council.
The purpose of the resource center, as suggested, would be to enhance
the capacity of state agencies to take a more effective role in consumer
protection. It would need to offer a much more comprehensive package of
"federal aid" than is now available to the states from the federal banking
agencies. As much of the technical assistance as possible should be sup-
plied to state banking agencies on request, but to the extent feasible, the
states might be expected to contribute toward the value of those services.
(2) Allocation of Enforcement by Contract
In the second and most critical part of this design, the federal supervi-
sory authorities, the existing bank agencies, or any of the possible consoli-
dated supervisory entities would adopt the policy, with congressional
authorization if necessary, of contracting with the individual states regard-
ing their respective shares of their now-mutual enforcement responsibili-
ties.
The guidelines for the negotiation of these contracts should stress their
purpose of assuring evenhanded and thorough enforcement of all con-
sumer laws in all states while recognizing the shared nature of that en-
forcement responsibility. States able and willing to handle a larger portion
of the enforcement load could bargain for it by demonstrating their capac-
ity to do so. For example, the "resource center" discussed above is in-
tended to provide an inducement and an opportunity for states to develop
their enforcement programs. To the extent states took on a larger share of
the enforcement load, federal enforcement resources would be freed up for
allocation elsewhere in other states or to maintain other aspects of the fed-
eral enforcement program.
The possible variations in these state-federal agreements are numerous.
One state might wish to take on virtually all enforcement duties within its
boundaries and do so effectively through technical assistance or payments
from the federal resource center. Another state might find its resources
spread so thin, or its state laws so minimal, that it would effectively with-
draw from consumer enforcement in favor of plenary enforcement by fed-
eral authorities. Other states could strike other balances. For example, a
state might elect to enforce all laws relating to credit costs (usury) and
disclosure (TIL), leaving the enforcement of laws on credit discrimination
and community responsibility to the federal agency. Yet another contract
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might contain an allocation of duties by size of bank or by geographic
region within the state. Still another state might prefer to pool its person-
nel with federal agents and have a joint enforcement program.
The burden of this recommendation is that it is possible to visualize a
genuinely cooperative venture in consumer protection by federal and state
agencies. This venture would be immensely flexible, to allow and en-
courage state initiative, but would always have the reserve authority of the
federal agencies to conduct their own comprehensive enforcement activi-
ties. The standards and criteria by which these state-federal agreements
would be negotiated and approved need much refinement as do the spe-
cific inducements that can be proffered to state agencies to take more ac-
tive roles. This approach, however, offers the prospect that open
recognition of shared responsibilities by federal and state authorities will
produce better consumer protection than the current system in which each
level of government operates virtually blind to the needs, capabilities, or
concerns of the other.
(3) Monitoring
A third ingredient in this "enforcement contract" package would be
monitoring. Either the federal resource center or its parent agency would
need to observe carefully the actual implementation of the various en-
forcement contracts, periodically evaluate them for effectiveness and effi-
ciency, and call for changes or adjustments when necessary. The
evaluation process might involve reviewing regular reports and critiques
from both the federal and state officials involved, monitoring complaint
data, and consulting with interested parties in the community, including
industry and consumers. The centralized nature of this monitoring and
data gathering function should permit a more reliable aggregate assess-
ment of the consumer financial-services marketplace and enable the super-
visory agency to suggest necessary substantive law changes as well as
needed enforcement modifications. Incidentally, it might also emphasize
to congressional oversight committees the complex problems of federalism
in the regulation of the consumer marketplace.
3. Enforcement Contract Alternatives
There are alternatives to the full-blown "enforcement contract" plan de-
scribed above, that would bring state bank supervisors more actively into
the enforcement picture. Each of the following alternatives, however, is
either only a piecemeal approach or of questionable feasibility.
First, federal enforcement agencies could exercise their authority to ex-
amine fully for compliance with state law without reference to what the
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state agencies are doing in that regard. This assumes that state enforce-
ment is negligible and will so continue. It would also require immense
additional expenditures by the federal agencies to create an examiner
corps conversant with the laws of the fifty states. In theory, the federal
agencies might justify these expenditures for consumer enforcement by
giving the state bank supervisors a larger role in examining for safety and
soundness, but it is doubtful whether either the agencies or the Congress
would want to diminish the traditional supervisory functions of the federal
agencies.
Second, state officials could be delegated the authority to enforce federal
laws without particularly coordinating that authority with federal agency
activity. The risk here is more uneven or duplicative enforcement.
Third, federal resources could be poured into state bank supervisors'
programs through grants, technical assistance, details of federal personnel,
and similar aid. There would be, however, no insistence on any quidpro
quo in the way of demonstrably strengthened enforcement.
Finally, the federal agencies could require, or strongly request, periodic
reports from the various state bank supervisors on the nature, extent, and
results of consumer enforcement activities in the states. This could be a
legitimate function of the new Federal Examination Council under its
mandate to create a state liaison committee to "encourage the application
of uniform examination principles and standards by state and federal su-
pervisory agencies." '' While regular reporting of state agency activity
might produce increased awareness of the level of state enforcement, it
would seem an empty gesture without some mechanism for acting on that
information.
4. State Examination of National Banks
Regardless of any other alterations that may be made in the structure of
federal and state enforcement programs, Congress should take action to
assure that state officials have an appropriate measure of visitorial access
to federally chartered institutions for the purpose of assuring compliance
with applicable state consumer laws. This was the recommendation of the
National Commission on Consumer Finance six years ago;' 52 it has been
the continuing plea of several state bank supervisors in more recent
years.' 53
The notions of national banks as protected "federal instrumentalities"
151. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3306 (Supp. 1979).
152. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 9, at 60.
153. See Senate Oversight Hearings on Consumer Protection Activities, supra note 41, at 3,
22, 46 (testimony of Commissioner Greenwald of Massachusetts, Commissioner Connell of
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subject to the "exclusive visitorial powers" of OCC are historical relics
exaggerated by constant repetition. On closer analysis, in the setting of the
consumer marketplace of the 1980's, it is difficult to see how privately
owned and locally situated national banks perform any unique "federal"
function in dispensing consumer credit and other services. It is equally
doubtful that the integrity of their federal charters is jeopardized by al-
lowing state personnel to evaluate a narrow aspect of their operations, for
example, consumer compliance, especially when the record shows a dearth
of effort by OCC to ensure compliance with state laws.
This is not to suggest that state officials be licensed to pillage the records
of national banks but rather that state officials who are responsible for
consumer enforcement be given the limited access to bank files and per-
sonnel necessary to accomplish that purpose. It may only be necessary for
Congress to specify that the Comptroller is authorized to grant such access;
good faith and personal integrity could do the rest.
This recommendation is particularly important if the "enforcement con-
tract" model is implemented, for a fully open and cooperative federal and
state approach to consumer protection would be undermined by continued
insulation of certain instructions behind an anachronistic screen of federal
instrumentality.
C. Execution of Enforcement Duties
The preceding suggestions concerning the reallocation of enforcement
duties among and between federal and state authorities have as their
theme the creation of a regulatory and enforcement structure that is effec-
tive, balanced, and comprehensive. Any such structure, including reten-
tion of the status quo, should also be as efficient and productive as
possible. There are a number of ways in which the enforcement process
might be improved.
I Interchange of Information on Enforcement Methodology
The enforcement techniques among the federal agencies are in a state of
evolution from an incidental feature of regular commercial exams to sepa-
rate, specially constructed programs involving compliance exams, special
exams, complaint processing, and educational functions. The states, at
least six of the seven examined, do not seem to have stressed or prioritized
consumer compliance as have the federal agencies. But if there is to be an
open and cooperative enforcement structure such as suggested above, it
Connecticut, and Deputy Administrator McCaffrey of Oklahoma). For additional discus-
sion of state access to national banks, see Rohner, supra note 1, at 38-42.
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would be desirable for the state and federal agencies to operate at
equivalent levels of sophistication. Thus, one of the functions of any fed-
eral-level "resource center" ought to be an ongoing interchange of infor-
mation between the federal and state agencies concerning the methodology
of their respective enforcement efforts. The maintenance of this in-
terchange might be an activity of the Council, or it could be done by the
suggested "Bureau" or other centralized federal consumer enforcement au-
thority.
2 Separation of Consumer and Commercial Examinations
The three federal banking agencies have separated the consumer com-
pliance examination from the regular commercial exam of which it was
originally a part. There are several reasons for this shift, including: expe-
diency; the need to respond to congressional pressure for improved con-
sumer compliance; and the need to develop and apply a body of expertise
quite different from that used in commercial exams. In the process, the
federal agencies have demonstrated that the exercise of their consumer en-
forcement responsibilities are more effectively accomplished outside the
confines of traditional bank examinations. The implications of this con-
clusion merit further exploration.
a. Enforcement Without On-Site Visitations
In theory, consumer compliance programs could be devised which do
not rely wholly on regular on-site bank visitations. There is nothing in the
federal consumer laws themselves, nor in the FISA, which compels the
agencies to "examine" for consumer compliance in the conventional way.
The agencies might, therefore, utilize completely alternative techniques,
such as reliance on consumer complaints to identify possible violations or
creation of investigation teams to pursue possible violations.'" 4 Such an
abrupt and dramatic shift away from routine on-premises compliance
checks would, however, be unwise both as a matter of public and congres-
sional relations and as a matter of substantive consumer protection. The
overriding value of some form of institutional examination is its deterrent
and preventive effect; that is, its capacity to bring bank practices into com-
pliance rather than merely to penalize violators after the fact. This value is
perceived as clearly by the banks as by the consumer, for the banks look to
the examinations in part as protection against consumer complaints or
154. The FTC, for example, does not have regular examination powers with respect to
nondepositary institutions and utilizes various investigative techniques to identify violators.
These techniques include monitoring media advertising, analyzing and investigating con-
sumer complaints, utilizing field investigations and subpoena power, and so on.
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
lawsuits. Thus, any suggestions that the bank agencies redesign their en-
forcement programs after the fashion of other agencies which have neither
the tradition nor the authority for regular periodic examinations should be
rejected.
b. Desirability of Separate Consumer Examinations
The separation of consumer compliance examinations from safety and
soundness ought to be viewed as more than a temporary or tentative expe-
dient. The nature and volume of the body of consumer law to be enforced
justifies distinctive rather than ancillary treatment. As a class, bank cus-
tomers - the intended beneficiaries of the consumer protection laws -
have expectations and needs separate and distinct from the bank's deposi-
tors and investors. Moreover, except in egregious cases where the banks
may be threatened by a devastating class action, it is unlikely that con-
sumer law violations affect institutional safety and soundness. All of these
considerations support the emphasis given to compliance exams by sepa-
rating them from commercial exams.
In addition, it is likely that the divergence of consumer compliance from
safety and soundness will increase as the volume and range of consumer
laws increase. Within the past several years, banks have been subjected to
the "civil rights" provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and to
the "community responsibility" rules of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
and Community Reinvestment Acts. The momentum of legal protections
for bank customers has already spilled over into the noncredit area 55 and
may eventually deal with other depositor services such as checking and
savings accounts.
The separation of compliance exams from safety and soundness exams
was probably not only inevitable but a necessity for the future. The en-
forcement agencies, state as well as federal, should develop compliance
programs in that light without being inhibited by any felt necessity to hold
to a commercial exam model. At the same time, it is probably unrealistic
to expect all states to initiate separate compliance examination programs
overnight. For the time being, state officials should at least plan their en-
forcement efforts cognizant of the experience in the federal agencies and
cognizant of the demonstrated need for distinctive treatment of consumer
compliance.
155. For a more detailed discussion of these emerging areas of legal protections, see
Rohner, supra note 1, at 42-49.
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c. Specialist Examiners
It is probably time to acknowledge that the day of the "generalist" bank
examiner has passed. While regular examiners have been assigned to con-
sumer compliance duty by the federal bank agencies, they have been reluc-
tant to enter that new and somewhat alien field. The examiners worried
about job security and career advancement. Moreover, they were expected
to be experts in such diverse areas as interest rate miscalculations and ef-
fects-test discrimination after only two weeks of training.
Though there is no basis for saying that the current consumer examiners
are incapable of doing adequate consumer exams, they are at least dis-
tracted by their prior experience in the commercial area and by their im-
minent return to that area. The temporary nature of their assignment to
consumer compliance is simply not conducive to developing an in-depth
expertise or sensitivity to the burgeoning body of consumer law. Even
within the consumer compliance area, it may be difficult for a given exam-
iner to be equally adept in all aspects.
The federal agencies are constantly reviewing the status of their con-
sumer examiner programs. They are committed to the assurance of career
paths for examiners who take on consumer compliance duty; the agencies
ought to formalize those arrangements as soon as possible. Beyond this, it
is premature to assume that some wholly new category of bank examiner
must be created, persons with different educational or professional back-
grounds than commercial examiners, for example, or persons with some
special interest or aptitude for consumer compliance work. But the agen-
cies ought to be evaluating their programs with an eye to such factors. If
compliance has become a distinctive aspect of agency activity, there is
clearly no advantage in continuing to insist that each examiner can per-
form equally well on both sides. The recognition of a new examiner classi-
fication with its own entering credentials and its own career path, and
possibly with subclasses for field personnel, complaint specialists, resource
persons, education specialists, and the like, may eventually be neces-
sary. 1
56
3. Adjustments in Examination Techniques
Once it is established that consumer compliance need not utilize the
same format as commercial examinations, a number of adjustments in the
compliance exam may be possible that could result in more efficient utili-
156. Some of this is already beginning to occur. See textual discussion at 323, The Ex-
aminer Corps, supra.
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zation of agency resources. The suggestions below are offered to provoke
further thought, not to guarantee improvements.
a. Off-Site Examinations
It would seem unnecessary to have an examiner physically visit each
and every banking institution in order to verify compliance with require-
ments respecting the form of bank documents. This seems true at least of
the required disclosure format under TIL, the permissible inquiries under
the ECOA, or the collected data under the HMDA. Such largely mechani-
cal "forms reviews" might be done more efficiently by teams of "form"
specialists in the regional offices, or even in Washington. With respect to
the preprinted portions of bank forms, the bank might simply be required
to submit copies of its documents for annual review. Even for information
which the bank or customer must insert in individual transactions - an-
nual percentage rates or finance charge computations - the requisite sam-
ple of completed forms might be reviewed at the regional or Washington
office level rather than by the examiner in the field.
Relieving the on-site examiner of some portion of these mechanical
chores would leave the examiner free to devote more time to an evaluation
of bank policies, operating procedures, and internal monitoring or audit
systems. It might also free more compliance personnel to serve as educa-
tional outreach persons for banks wanting that assistance.
b. Specialized Examinations
It may be fruitful to divide what is presently an across-the-board com-
pliance exam into several more focused, specialized exams. Obvious can-
didates over the next few years would be special exams for compliance
with "community responsibility" laws or for civil rights compliance. Fur-
thermore, a given bank's level of compliance in one area might be so high
that only occasional spot checks would be needed for that area while other
aspects would demand more constant attention.
The state of Massachusetts has used this system of specialized exams to
the apparent satisfaction of the bank commissioner.' 57 Some closer analy-
sis of the Massachusetts experience might indicate its wider adaptability.
c. Alternative Investigatory Techniques
There may be effective alternate ways of generating information about
possible violations other than on-site examinations. One technique is
"testing," which involves having enforcement personnel deal with banks
157. See House Oversight Hearings on TIL Enforcement, supra note 53, at 43 (testimony
of Commissioner Greenwald).
[Vol. 29:313
Regulation of Consumer Financial Services
by phone or in person as if they were real customers. This device may be
particularly useful in determining whether the institution is engaging in
illegal prescreening or redlining practices.- 58 Regular consultation with
community and consumer groups may also shed light on bank practices
which would not appear in an on-site examination. Interviews with prior
bank customers or applicants may be useful in verifying bank practices
and customer satisfaction.
Some of these techniques may, in fact, be inefficient or time-consuming,
or simply unproductive. The suggestion here is only that the agencies
ought not hesitate to experiment with them and with other investigatory
methods.
d Advanced Scheduling of Examinations
Since the primary focus of commercial exams is to determine the safety
of the bank's condition, it has traditionally been thought necessary to
schedule those exams on an unannounced basis. Surprise visitations seem
less necessary in the compliance area unless one cynically assumes the
banks will falsify documents and retroactively amend their operating poli-
cies. Compliance exams are, in fact, often scheduled by the federal agen-
cies on an advance-notice basis, and this seems wise and largely riskless. It
should permit the bank personnel to prepare material in advance of the
examiner's arrival with resulting time savings. It might even be suggested
that banks always be given the maximum possible advance notice of com-
pliance exams on the theory that forewarning will prompt careful internal
audits. The goal, after all, is compliance, not after-the-fact correction.
e. Focus on Bank's Internal Procedures
At least one of the federal agencies instructs its examiners to give atten-
tion to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the bank's own internal
auditing and monitoring systems as well as to a file-by-file check for viola-
tions. This would seem to be efficient use of examiner time, especially in
very large banks where the effort needed even to sample, much less evalu-
ate, files from dozens of branches could be excessive in light of its results.
There is something of a David-and-Goliath aspect to the thought of an
examiner trainee or assistant examiner challenging the correctness of, or
providing useful suggestions about, forms and practices carefully reviewed
and approved by expert bank counsel. Some of this flavor emerged in con-
versations with bankers; for example, a disposition to pickiness. by the ex-
158. For a discussion of this technique and its effects, see House Oversight Hearings on
ECOA and FHA Enforcement, supra note 19, at 35-36 (testimony of Commissioner Green-
wald).
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aminers and a reluctance by large banks to acknowledge any educational
value in the examiner's visit. This suggests the desirability of matching the
examiner's level of expertise to the level of sophistication of the bank; for
very large banks this might mean that the most effective and efficient ex-
amination would consist of some spot checks of transaction files but con-
siderable assessment of the thoroughness and correctness of the bank
compliance officer's programs.
f Frequency of Examinations
Another apparent carry-over from the safety and soundness tradition is
the sense that compliance exams ought to be conducted frequently, as close
to annually as possible. Presently, the Board examines annually, the
FDIC conducts examinations every fifteen months, while the OCC intends
to do compliance exams every two years. There would seem to be no par-
ticular magic to annual exams. The choice may be put: is it better to have
shallower exams more frequently or in-depth exams less often? With the
federal agencies now planning to order corrective remedies in the form of
restitution and refunds, banks gain little by delaying their own compliance
efforts, and a reasonable case can be made for less frequent but more com-
prehensive examinations.
4. Complaint Handling, Education
The complaint handling and educational aspects of bank agency en-
forcement need considerable rethinking and original thinking, respec-
tively. Without impugning the industriousness or good faith of the agency
personnel, the complaint procedures appear to be largely unproductive ex-
cept as band-aid responses to some consumer grievances. The agencies
have been anxious to respond to congressional criticism and so have inun-
dated the banks with brochures and complaint forms for distribution to the
public, drawing anger and sometimes ridicule from the very bankers
whose cooperation may be essential in seeking amicable settlements of cus-
tomer complaints. Additionally, the complaint recordkeeping systems of
the agencies are incompatible with each other and both individually and
collectively are of little use in identifying types and patterns of serious vio-
lations. The agency complaint handling procedures have only been oper-
ating, in a formal way, since 1974 or 1975, and the staff persons involved
acknowledge that they are still in a preliminary stage.
Each of the agencies is making efforts to improve both the efficiency of
the procedures and the usefulness of the complaint data. Those efforts cer-
tainly should continue. The value of extensive complaint handling mecha-
nisms, however, lies not only in the responses they provide for individual
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customers but also in the aggregate picture customer complaints can create
of bank practices. Especially in the area of civil rights and community
responsibility, the complaint intake may be an invaluable source of leads
as to the existence of discriminatory and redlining practices.
In order to derive these larger benefits, it is important that the agencies
use standardized procedures so that similar cases are handled similarly no
matter which agency is involved. Secondly, information about complaints
and their disposition needs to be retrievable in a standardized format to
permit meaningful analysis and comparison for all three agencies. In ad-
dition, that data needs to be recorded in a form which permits thorough
and qualitative analysis of the types of complaints and the types and sever-
ity of violations detected. Finally, the agencies ought to allocate the neces-
sary resources to permit on-site field investigations of complaints that
cannot be satisfactorily resolved through exchanges of correspondence.
It is of course true that standardization can become stultification if each
agency must imitate the other without opportunities for experimentation
or innovation. The current complaint handling process, however, may not
be able to achieve some of its basic goals without data and analyses which
are comparable and combinable. Agency individuality, at the present
time, is counterproductive.
The educational programs of the federal banking agencies consist pri-
marily of the preparation of fliers, booklets, and the like and the distribu-
tion of copies of pertinent laws and regulations. Some contracts have been
given to outside firms for the production of educational films on specific
topics. None of the agencies has made an inroad into school curricula,
59
obviously the most fertile area for developing an informed consuming
public. The problem with regulatory agency educational programs may lie
in the simple fact that the personnel conducting those programs are out of
their field; they are lawyers, bank examiners, or economists, but they are
not professional educators or professionals in the communications media.
To mount effective educational programs, the agencies must be prepared
to commit the substantial funds necessary to retain a complement of pro-
fessional communicators and educators to work with agency staff on trans-
lating substantive rights, remedies, obligations, and procedures into
meaningful messages for the public.
It is also clearly counterproductive and inefficient for each federal
agency, and conceivably each of the fifty state agencies, to conduct in-
dependent, and therefore duplicative, educational programs. One primary
159. The FDIC, however, has made some initial efforts in this area. See note 49 and
accompanying text supra.
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function of the "Consumer Enforcement Resource Center" suggested
above would therefore be the coordination and steering of a nationwide
consumer education effort.
5. Agency Enforcement Sanctions
A final area in which the banking agencies, primarily the federal agen-
cies, have developed momentum is remedies for violations as well as pro-
spective compliance. 6' The development of real clout on the part of the
agencies, however, is long overdue for several reasons. Unless the enforce-
ment agencies are prepared to take prompt and strong steps to see that the
injurious effects of past violations are undone, their "go and sin no more"
admonitions for the future are mere verbal slaps on the wrist. Prospective-
only corrective orders do nothing for past victims and serve little deterrent
value for future conduct. The past lack of aggressiveness of agency en-
forcement has undoubtedly contributed to the felt need to develop strong
private remedies which at times appear to have led to eruptions of expen-
sive, inefficient, and even harassing litigation.
Perhaps the most insidious effect of bland agency enforcement policies is
the attitude engendered among banks that the maximum extent of their
compliance responsibility is to respond dutifully to examination reports.
Where banks are induced to measure their compliance responsibility by
the results of an examiner's report, there is less motivation for them, their
counsel, and their trade associations to develop strong compliance pro-
grams on their own. The very casualness of the agency enforcement pro-
gram results in a shifting of a greater portion of the compliance burden to
those agencies.
This suggests that enforcement techniques such as restitution of
overcharges, including notification to customers of their rights and correc-
tive steps such as proposed in the Regulation B guidelines, are healthy
steps to a better balanced enforcement environment. These innovations
are understandably painful to banks, as much for their novelty as for their
economic implications. In the future, however, judicious agency insistence
on strong remedies ought to produce greater incentive for industry self-
policing, greater customer satisfaction with the operation of the market-
place, and less exposure by institutions to the uncertain liabilities of pri-
vate litigation.
160. For a detailed discussion of remedial measures, see notes 50-82 and accompanying
text supra.
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III. CONCLUSION
The dominant role in the regulation and enforcement of consumer pro-
tections for bank customers is shifting more and more from state legisla-
tures and state agencies to Congress and the federal bank supervisors. The
shift in roles has produced some new and unexpected frictions attributable
to dual regulatory structures. The reduction of those frictions and the im-
provement of the overall system of consumer protection probably cannot
be achieved, and certainly is not likely to be achieved, by radical surgery
on the federal and state regulatory mechanisms. Rather, those goals can
realistically be pursued only by thoughtful and careful accommodation of
the legitimate interests and capabilities of both levels of government. This
task ought to be high on governmental agendas through the 1980's.

